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Zusammenfassung 
Der Begriff „Local Ownership“ findet sich immer häufiger in Berichten, Stellungnahmen und 
Leitfäden internationaler Akteure, die im Bereich Peacebuilding tätig sind. Dennoch gibt es 
bisher weder eine kohärente Theorie zu Local Ownership, noch eine gemeinsame 
Auffassung darüber, was die Umsetzung von Local Ownership in der Praxis bedeutet. Wie 
können lokale Bevölkerungen die Hoheit über Peacebuilding-Prozesse anteilig oder 
vollkommen „besitzen“, wenn diese doch vor allem von externen Akteuren dominiert 
werden?  
Momentan spiegelt die akademische Debatte über Local Ownership den übergeordneten 
theoretischen Diskurs zwischen kommunitaristischen und liberalen Positionen in den 
Internationalen Beziehungen (IB) wider. Vor Ort ist die Herangehensweise internationaler 
Missionen überwiegend von liberalen Positionen bestimmt. Local Ownership bedeutet 
dabei auf dem strategischen Level weniger die Frage nach lokaler Autonomie und der 
Auswahl von Programmen und Prioritäten, sondern vielmehr der Versuch, bereits 
vordefinierte und vordesignte internationale Politiken an lokale Realitäten anzupassen. 
Insbesondere bei den Themen Rechtstaatlichkeit und der Administration von Wahlen, den 
Kernbereichen dieses Forschungsprojekts, existieren schon internationale Blaupausen für 
eine Vielzahl von Programmbereichen. Im Gegensatz dazu werden in persönlichen 
Herangehensweisen internationaler Akteure auf der Arbeitsebene öfter kommunitaristische 
oder Bottom-up-Ansätze genutzt, die Freiräume für lokale Partner schaffen und 
unterstützen möchten, in welchen Local Ownership unter Einbezug von lokalen Traditionen 
ermöglicht wird. 
Trotz dieser Unterschiede gibt es bei der praktischen Umsetzung vor Ort bereits einige 
Methoden und Instrumente der Kooperation zwischen nationalen und internationalen 
Akteuren, die lokale Teilhabe, Akzeptanz und auch Ownership unterstützen. Neue 
Einsichten zu ebendiesen Erfahrungen mit Local Ownership auf dem operativen Level von 
Friedenseinsätzen zu generieren, war die Hauptzielsetzung der Forschung des ZIF. Das 
Projekt untersuchte dabei, wie das Prinzip Local Ownership in einer Mission mit 
Exekutivmandat und Regierungsverantwortung (UNMIK im Kosovo) und in einer Mission 
mit Unterstützungsfunktion, aber ohne Exekutivmandat (UNMIL in Liberia) umgesetzt 
wurde. Da die oben erwähnte konzeptionelle Unklarheit auch vor Ort vorgefunden wurde, 
stellte sich die Operationalisierung des Begriffes für die Feldforschung als recht schwierig 
dar. In einigen Fällen konnten Informationen und Schlussfolgerungen zu Local Ownership 
in den Gesprächen nur indirekt gezogen werden, indem beispielsweise nach praktischen 
Interaktionsmustern statt Definitionen gefragt wurde. 
Die empirischen Erkenntnisse des Projekts zeigen, das Local Ownership innerhalb der 
Programmarbeit von internationalen Friedenseinsätzen fast ausschließlich mit 
Regierungsstrukturen umgesetzt wird und typischerweise weder die Zivilgesellschaft, noch 
die weitere Öffentlichkeit eines Landes mit einbezieht. Darüber hinaus ist die Interaktion 
zwischen internen (lokalen) und externen (internationalen) Akteuren größtenteils von einer 
asymmetrischen Beziehungsstruktur geprägt; internationale Akteure dominieren diese 
Beziehung – und behindern so Local Ownership. Des Weiteren sahen viele 
Gesprächspartner einen klaren Unterschied zwischen Missionen mit einem 
Exekutivmandat und reinen Unterstützungsmissionen ohne exekutive Funktionen für die 
Umsetzung von Local Ownership. Manche stellten sogar eine generelle Unvereinbarkeit 
eines Exekutivmandats mit dem Prinzip Local Ownership fest. 
Dennoch konnten in beiden Missionen und beiden Themenbereichen einige so genannte 
„Best Practices“ identifiziert werden. Sowohl lokale, als auch internationale 
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Gesprächspartner erwähnten häufig Co-Location (räumliche Zusammenführung 
internationalen und nationalen Personals) als ein Schlüsselinstrument für gute Kooperation 
und gemeinsames Lernen. Ebenfalls hohen Zuspruch erhielten Programme zum 
Anwerben und Weiterbilden von nationalen Angestellten (National Professional Officers) in 
Friedenseinsätzen, auch wenn dabei immer die Gefahr der Abwanderung qualifizierter 
nationaler Experten (Brain Drain) besteht. Darüber hinaus versprachen sich viele 
Gesprächspartner einen Vorteil für die Umsetzung von Local Ownership, wenn stärker auf 
regionale Berater, Moderatoren und Institutionen zurückgegriffen würde; auch regionale 
Lösungsvorschläge und existierende regionale Traditionen (bspw. in der Rechtssprechung 
und Verwaltung) könnten hilfreich sein. Sehr häufig wurde von nationalen 
Gesprächspartnern kritisiert, dass internationales Personal zu wenig interkulturelle 
Kompetenzen besitzt und nur eine geringe Bereitschaft, auch von lokalen Partnern zu 
lernen. Dort, wo nationale Akteure Respekt fühlten und aktiv von ihren internationalen 
Partnern angehört wurden, war auch die lokale Teilhabe größer und nachhaltiger. 
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Executive Summary 
The term “local ownership” has increasingly appeared in statements, guidelines, and 
reports of actors involved in peacebuilding. However, no coherent theories on local 
ownership exist as of yet and considerable unclarity prevails about what the concept 
implies in practice. How can a local population actually “own” a process such as 
peacebuilding which is predominantly driven from the outside? Up to now, the academic 
discussion on local ownership can be placed into the overarching theoretical discourse on 
peacebuilding processes which mirrors the wider debate between communitarian and 
liberal approaches in normative international relations theory. In the field, most inter-
national actors approach local ownership from a liberal stance. Their starting point is an 
international agenda that should be implemented in the local context. Local ownership on 
the strategic level is thus not primarily about local autonomy and choosing programs and 
priorities. It is rather about the search for approaches to adjust pre-defined and pre-
designed international policies that local structures should carry out eventually. Especially 
in the two focus areas of the research project, i.e., rule of law and electoral administration, 
international agencies have produced a variety of blueprints for many programmatic areas. 
In contrast, communitarian or bottom-up approaches, which emphasize the need to create 
and nurture space for local actors and traditions to foster ownership, were founded less on 
the strategic level than on personal approaches to the working level of a mission.  
Nevertheless, the practical implementation in the field can apply modes of interaction and 
mechanisms of cooperation between external and internal actors, modes which are con-
ducive for local participation, acceptance, and ownership. The research was designed to 
generate new insights on this operational level of local ownership in peacebuilding pro-
cesses. The project examined how the principle of local ownership has been applied in an 
executive peace operation with full governance powers (UNMIK in Kosovo) and a non-exe-
cutive mission with mere assistance functions (UNMIL in Liberia). As the already mentio-
ned conceptual amiguity has also been found in the field, it was difficult to operationalize 
local ownership for the research in Liberia and Kosovo. Often, understandings of the term 
and conclusions had to be drawn indirectly, e.g. in enquiring how interaction worked. 
In addition, the empirical findings of this study confirm that most peace operations address 
local ownership in their program work only toward a national government and its 
institutions and typically do not consider civil society and the wider public of a host nation. 
Most interactions between external and internal actors are dominated by an asymmetric 
relationship in favor of the internationals which often hinders ownership. Moreover, 
interviewees perceived a clear difference between executive and non-executive mandates 
of a mission for local ownership. Some went as far as claiming that an executive mandate 
could never be reconciled with the principle of local ownership. 
Then again, best practices for local ownership were identified in both missions and each of 
the two focus areas. Internal and external interviewees often named co-location schemes 
as being a key for cooperation and mutual learning. Mission programs to hire and train 
National Professional Officers (NPOs) earned some praise, but also mixed feelings 
because of potential “brain drain” or other related problems. Regionalization, i.e. using 
regional advisors and facilitators in a mission, but also looking for regional best practices or 
useful traditions was also highlighted as a tool to strengthen local ownership.  
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Local interviewees often stated that the key problems for local ownership are the lack of 
intercultural skills and willingness to learn of international staff deployed to the field. Local 
participation and gradual ownership succeeded where national actors felt respected and 
heard by their international partners. 
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1.  Research Objectives and Methodology 
1.1  Background to the Project 
Between January 2007 and September 2009, the Center for International Peace 
Operations (ZIF) implemented the research project “Local Ownership in Peacebuilding 
Processes. Approaches, Experiences, and Prerequisites for Success. An empirical study 
of peace operations in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Liberia (UNMIL)” which was funded by the 
German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). The project was designed to generate 
empirical insights into the implementation of local ownership by international peace 
operations. For reasons of research economy, the project was focused exclusively on the 
implementation of local ownership in two key functional areas of peacebuilding processes: 
the (re-)establishment of rule of law and electoral administration. In order to establish 
whether the application of the concept of local ownership varies between missions with 
executive and non-execitive mandates, one case study for each type was chosen. 
Whereas UNMIK in Kosovo had full governance powers for several years, UNMIL in 
Liberia fulfills an assistance role to the government of Liberia. The choice of UNMIK and 
UNMIL for this comparative study was based on the fact that elections and rule of law play 
a prominent role in the mandates of both missions. 
The project was implemented in six phases: The first phase began with a review of 
academic literature on local ownership and related themes as well as on the selected case 
studies. This included policy papers, grey literature and official documents of the United 
Nations. An expert workshop, informed by working papers, concluded the first phase. The 
second phase included the operationalization of the concept local ownership for field 
research, the development of a research questionnaire for semi-structured interviews as 
well as the establishment of selection criteria for interviewees and their identification in the 
field. During the third phase, interviews were conducted with mission staff. The fourth 
phase concentrated on the analysis and interpretation of the information gained including a 
tentative formulation of results. Two international expert roundtables in New York and 
Berlin in June 2009 constituted the fifth phase of the project and led to a validation of the 
results. The sixth phase of the project consists of the final report, policy papers and articles 
for academic journals, the development of a training module as well as briefings for the 
German parliament, ministries, and the general public. 
Altogether, three research trips were undertaken to each, Kosovo and Liberia, with stays 
between one and three weeks.1 During the 2007 elections in Kosovo, one of the 
researchers participated in the Election Observation Mission of the Council of Europe. 
Moreover, ZIF conducted two workshops at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (KAIPTC) with single sessions on local ownership: the first on “Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding” in Liberia in November 2007, the second on “Elections in Post-
Conflict Countries” in June 2008. 
 
                                                                              
1  Kosovo in September and November 2007 and in March 2008; Liberia in November 2007 and in April and November 
2008. 
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1.2  Research Objectives and Questions 
The ZIF project on “Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes” aimed to fill the existing 
research gap on local ownership by both analytically clarifying the concept and by 
exploring the details of its implementation in the field.2 The project thus delivers: 
? an input to the conceptual development of local ownership; 
? an improved, empirically based understanding of the problems encountered in 
implementing the concept on the ground; 
? the development of practical recommendations for both political decision-
makers and personnel in peacekeeping missions. 
Consequently, the key research questions were: 
a) What approaches for the implementation of local ownership do currently exist 
in peace operations? 
b) What lessons can be drawn from their success or failure to increase the 
sustainability of peacebuilding processes? 
 
1.3  Methodological Approach 
The project is an example of qualitative and inductive research. The research addressed a 
topic, local ownership, on which only limited empirical data is available and which lacks a 
coherent theoretical underpinning. 
The project relied heavily on the results of semi-structured interviews in the field. Where 
applicable, project participants conducted discussion groups with local actors (such as 
election magistrates or parliamentarians in Liberia), group meetings with international 
actors (such as international employees working at UNMIK and other international 
agencies in Kosovo), or roundtables with representatives of both groups. Over 150 
persons were interviewed in both countries split evenly between local and international 
actors (see table 1 for target groups).3 
 
Table 1: Target groups 
 International Actors Local Actors 
 
• International employees in peace 
operations who are implementing 
activities in the areas of Rule of Law 
and Elections (operational level) 
• International employees in peace 
operations (strategic level) 
• Employees of other IOs and INGOs 
in the field 
• Employees of think tanks with 
regional knowledge (ICG, IFES, etc.) 
• Local representatives of politics or 
society who deal with Rule of Law 
or Elections on the operational 
level 
• Local representatives of politics or 
society (strategic level) 
• Local employees in peace 
operations 
• Local experts (think tanks, NGOs) 
• Local journalists 
                                                                              
2  See ZIF research proposal. W.Hansen et al., “Ansätze, Erfahrungen und Erfolgsbedingungen,” in Local Ownership in 
Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States, Berlin: 2005, pp. 16-22. 
3  See Annex for a complete list of interviewees. Some interviewees were met and interviewed two or three times on 
different trips. 
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The distinction originally made by the authors between “local” and “international” actors 
proved to be difficult to maintain with regard to National Professional Officers (NPOs) 
employed by international missions. Though qualified by the authors as local actors (see 
table 1), they tended to see themselves as part of the international mission, often referring 
to their compatriots as their local counterparts. A further problematic category, particularly 
in Liberia, but to some extent also in Kosovo, consisted of members of diaspoara 
communities who had returned after the end of the armed conflicts. Often perceived as 
“outsiders” by the local population, they frequently voiced positions that fell between those 
of the international and local interviewees.  
To address these complex issues, some researchers have suggested utilizing the 
distinction between “external” and “internal” rather than “international” and “local” actors.4 
However, such a distinction relies on a subjective (self-) classification by either the 
interviewee or the researcher. The categories “international” and “local” as outlined above, 
although far from ideal, at least have the advantage of being unambiguous and were thus 
retained by the authors. 
The interviews themselves were semi-structured, between 30 to 90 minutes long and 
based on the issue areas of a research questionnaire which had been developed in an 
expert workshop prior to the field research.5 
The project closed its final research phase with two validation workshops in New York and 
Berlin in June 2009 where results and recommendations were presented to an audience 
consisting of representatives of UN agencies and departments (DPKO, DPA, UNDP, etc.) 
as well as practitioners from the field, academics, and long-term advisors of the project. 
Their feedback was included in the final report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
4  H. Reich, “Local Ownership in Conflict Transformation Projects. Partnership, Participation or Patronage?” Berghof 
Occasional Paper Issue 27, Berlin: 2006. 
5  See annex for a list of topical areas for the research questionnaire. 
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2.  Defining Local Ownership 
The term “local ownership”6 has increasingly appeared in statements, guidelines, and 
reports of actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding. In February 2011, the United 
Nations published the key report on “Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict” which 
highlights four main principles to improve the performance of the UN in post-conflict 
peacebuilding: ownership, partnership, expertise and nimbleness. The report states that a 
“primary task of the international response is to identify, protect, nurture and support 
national capacities”.7 
However, as Pouligny observed, “the prominence of the phrase is not matched by a 
corresponding depth of analysis, explanation or scrutiny in policy statements. The different 
agencies have been also slow in translating these commitments into practice.”8 No 
coherent theories on local ownership exist as of yet and considerable unclarity prevails 
about what the concept implies in practice and how a local population can actually “own” a 
process such as peacebuilding which is clearly driven from outside.9 
Nevertheless, first attempts were undertaken to define local ownership in the context of 
peacebuilding processes. According to Narten, “[l]ocal ownership is the process and the 
final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of 
assessment, planning and decision-making functions, the practical management and 
implementation of these functions, and the evaluation and control of all phases of 
statebuilding programs, with the aim of making external peace- and statebuilding 
assistance redundant.”10 This definition clearly reflects the ambiguity of the current debate 
on local ownership. On the one hand, it assumes that external actors should control 
peacebuilding processes, on the other hand, it calls for the involvement of local actors in 
the assessment and planning phases of projects. 
Accordingly, the academic discussion on local ownership can be placed into an 
overarching theoretical discourse on peacebuilding processes which mirrors the wider 
debate between communitarian and liberal approaches in normative international relations 
theory.11 The communitarian vision of peacebuilding stresses the role of the local society: 
Peacebuilding should “nurture and create the political, economic and social space within 
which indigenous actors can identify, develop and employ the resources necessary to build 
a peaceful, just and prosperous society.”12 In contrast, the liberal view on peacebuilding 
emphasizes the importance of global norms, in particular human rights, of good 
                                                                              
6  The United Nations and other sources frequently use the term “national ownership” in documents and guidelines. No 
clear definition of national ownership or distinction from the term “local ownership” exists as of yet. Instead, the term is 
mostly used congruently with the term “local ownership” in defining not only national governments, but “national 
stakeholders, inter alia, government officials, justice and other rule of law officials, national legal professionals, 
traditional leaders, women, children, minorities, refugees and displaced persons, other marginalized groups and civil 
society” as partners for local ownership. United Nations, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to 
Rule of Law Assistance,” 2008, p. 3. The authors thus decided to use only the term “local ownership” both for the 
interviews in the field as well as for this report. Since 2011, the UN has started to use the term “ownership” withouth 
“local”.  
7  United Nations, “Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group”, 2011, 
p.5. 
8  B. Pouligny, “Supporting Local Ownership in Humanitarian Action,” GPPi Policy Paper No. 4, Berlin: 2009, p. 6. 
9  S. Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN State Building Operations,” in 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1 (2007) 1: p. 7. 
10  J. Narten, “Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: The Case of Postwar Kosovo,” in The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. R. Paris and T. Sisk, London: 
Routledge, 2009, p. 254. 
11  T. Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” in 
Peace & Change 34 (2009) 1: p. 6. 
12  K. Bush, “Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Developmental Agenda for Peacebuilding,” in Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies (Special Issue, 1996): p. 86. 
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governance, and the liberal market economy, which local structures need to adopt.13 
According to Donais, the “concept of local ownership is the core issue around which these 
two perspectives diverge”14 in peacebuilding processes. 
In most cases, however, international actors approach local ownership from a liberal 
stance. Their starting point is an international agenda that should be implemented in the 
local context. Local ownership is not primarily about local autonomy and choosing 
programs and priorities. It is rather about the search for strategies to adjust pre-defined 
and pre-designed international policies that local structures should carry out eventually.15 It 
has been argued that local ownership should be seen as the end and not as the means of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Existing conditions prevailing on the ground as well as political 
or strategic objectives of the international community would prevent the significant input of 
local actors in relevant decision-making processes.16 
Especially in the fields of rule of law and electoral administration, international agencies 
produced a variety of blueprints for many programmatic areas. They carry so much weight 
that local actors cannot change the content, but can only interpret or adapt such blueprints 
to local demands and environments. These blueprints are based on dominant liberal 
principles in peacebuilding which are “non-negotiable principles about democratic rule, 
human rights, liberal economic policy, and rule of law.”17 In addition, donors and 
international experts often follow a model of social engineering that sees local knowledge 
and structures as obstacles rather than as entry points for peacebuilding.18 The practical 
consequences of such approaches even influence the personal relationships of external 
and internal actors in peacebuilding and create images, prejudices, and clichés that are 
hard to overcome. 
Even though liberal views on local ownership dominate the debate on peacebuilding on the 
strategic level, the operational level still can be shaped in a more communitarian, bottom-
up practice to enable ownership. Bush’s image of the “nurturing space” for indigenous 
actors has been explored by Reich who suggests the concept of “learning sites” to foster 
local ownership on the actual working level.19 Such learning sites, for example joint 
workshops or retreats at different stages of a project cycle, could lead to a more equal 
partnership between external and internal actors. In order to succeed, both sides have to 
be committed to mutual learning processes.20 
 
Intervention and interaction: asymmetric relationships? 
Working toward local ownership constitutes an integral element of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. In particular during extended and highly intrusive peace operations, there is 
a danger of abusing the rhetoric of local ownership for political purposes. On the one hand, 
the concept can be invoked to downplay the intrusiveness of the intervention and to justify 
a continuing international presence. On the other hand, the concept can be used as an 
argument in support of a premature departure of international staff once mission fatigue 
has set in and international engagement is needed in another post-conflict area. 
                                                                              
13  Donais, 2009, p. 6. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  S. Chesterman, You, the People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 4. 
17  O. J. Sending, “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive to Context,” NUPI Working Paper 755, 
2009, p. 8. 
18  Ibid., pp. 8 et seq. 
19  Reich, 2006, pp. 23-25. 
20  Ibid., pp. 26-30. 
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External actors might also see local ownership as a tool that allows them to give the 
impression of taking into account the wishes of the local population, while in fact continuing 
to implement their agendas without local involvement. This reveals the core problem of the 
approach: How can transformation processes that are internationally designed and 
implemented ever be truly “owned” by local actors? The term “local ownership” distracts 
from the fact that international interventions tend to be characterized by an asymmetric 
relationship between external and internal actors.21 In most cases, donors and international 
organizations have shaped the agenda, assessed the situation, and designed the 
programs long before there is any local involvement. Even if project objectives 
subsequently aim for local ownership, for example by providing project benchmarks and by 
prescribing participatory program implementation, the asymmetric relationship is likely to 
prevent the establishment of local authority and responsibility.22 Instead of appealing to 
local ownership, an in-depth discussion of the interaction between external and internal 
actors might be needed as well as the search for project frameworks that can counter 
existing asymmetrical relationships. 
A further danger is that the over-use of the term “local ownership” by international actors 
can lead to unrealistic expectations of full local control among their local partners. These 
are bound to be disappointed. Local ownership may also lead external experts to believe 
that they are able to steer and control very complex processes on the local level.23 In 
addition, there exists another asymmetry between internal and external actors with respect 
to the available knowledge on local systems and relations, an asymmetry which local 
actors might exploit by refusing to contribute their knowledge and capacities to the 
international peacebuilding effort. Generally, the patterns and forums of interaction 
between internal and external actors as well as their perceptions of one another are 
fundamental for local ownership. 
 
Choosing local partners for local ownership 
Choice of local partners in the field has attracted much attention in academic research.24 
One question is whether only elites25 or also the general public should be considered as 
local partners for a mission. International attempts to work toward local ownership have 
thus far concentrated on elites and government institutions. Referring to experiences with 
the UN administration in Timor, Chopra and Hohe claim that “the subculture of UN 
missions, their leadership, and much of their staff, was rooted in a diplomatic habit, relating 
institution to institution or at most talking to a minority elite.”26 They call this an “asocial 
form of alienation” which can be disastrous for international missions’ capacities to assist 
or govern in a post-conflict situation.27 This predisposition is sometimes accompanied by a 
tendency to regard the local population as a uniform group. Moreover, most international 
staff members are deployed in urban areas and have very limited contact with the rural 
population. But a broad implementation of a local ownership agenda needs to take into 
                                                                              
21  Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
22  Ibid. 
23  See T. Pietz and L. von Carlowitz, Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States, ZIF Report, 2007, p. 
8. 
24  See, among others, A. Hansen, “Local Ownership in Peace Operations,” in Local Ownership and Security Sector 
Reform, ed. T. Donais, DCAF Yearbook 6, 2008, pp. 43-45. 
25  Elites in post-conflict societies include the key political, religious, and military leaders involved in a conflict. These 
people are often the highest leaders of the government and/or opposition movements. In most cases, they represent 
a few key actors within the broader conflict setting. 
26  J. Chopra and T. Hohe, “Participatory Intervention,” in Global Governance 10 (2004) 3: p. 290. 
27  Ibid. 
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account demands of non-elite actors and to consider community-based knowledge found 
in remote rural areas. 
Not enough attention has been paid in the past to questions of legitimacy and 
accountability of local counterparts. External actors often select local partners whose 
legitimacy and accountability are highly questionable. This is in part caused by the break-
down of formal structures which is typical of post-conflict societies. In addition, there is an 
understandable tendency among external actors to look for like-minded partners, 
regardless of legitimacy and accountability. Thus internationals often choose local 
counterparts solely on the basis of their English-language skills, often acquired through a 
Western education or time spent abroad in Western countries. There is a lack of 
competence and knowledge of international missions to identify adequate local partners in 
most post-conflict societies. Peace operations should concentrate on selecting local 
counterparts on the basis of who could serve as effective partners in given peacebuilding 
processes. 
Another problem of partners and local ownership is constituted in the debate on “spoilers”. 
The term is politically loaded, it can “represent normative judgments that give a great deal 
of agency to third party custodians of a peace process.”28 The difference between 
“spoiling” and legitimate but annoying political dissent is fleeting. And a reform partner in 
one context may be a spoiler in another. 
Newman and Richmond provide a working definition describing spoilers and spoiling as 
“groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement 
through a variety of means and for a variety of purposes.”29 Spoilers can be both insiders 
and outsiders to the peace process. If they constitute insiders – the very elite the 
international mission is cooperating with – then applying the key principle of local 
ownership runs the risk of involving local partners who are, or were, part of the conflict.30 
Keeping such actors in positions of power and influence might not contribute to sustainable 
peace.31 On the other hand, “increased local ownership and sensitivity may strengthen the 
legitimacy of the reform effort, thereby undermining the spoilers’ platform.”32 Generally, 
“whomever they [the international actors] endorse as the legitimate counterpart, the choice 
is highly political and will have profound implications for the future political development of 
the host state or territory.”33 
 
Dilemmas of local ownership 
Despite the fuzziness of the concept of local ownership, Narten34 and also Hansen and 
Wiharta35 developed first typologies of key dilemmas for the implementation of local 
ownership in peacebuilding processes. Based on their work, the following overarching 
dilemmas were formulated for the further operationalization of the concept: 
                                                                              
28  E. Newman and O. Richmond, “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peacebuilding,” UNU Policy Brief 
No. 2, 2006, p. 5. 
29  Ibid., p. 1. 
30  Ibid., p. 2. 
31  See E. Scheye, “Transitions to Local Authority,” in Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations, ed. R. 
Dwan, SIPRI Research Report No. 16, 2002, p. 104. 
32  A. Hansen et al., “The Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict. A Practitioners’ 
Guide,” FBA Handbook Series No. 2, Stockholm: 2007, p. 25. 
33  A. Hansen, “Local Ownership in Peace Operations“, in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. T. Donais, 
DCAF Yearbook 6, 2008, p. 44. 
34  J. Narten, “Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: A Case Study on External-local Dynamics in Kosovo 
under UN Interim Administration,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Chicago, 
March 3, 2007, pp. 16 et seq., available at <http://64.112.226.70/one/isa/isa07/> (last visited April 9, 2010). 
35  A. Hansen and S. Wiharta, The Transition to a Just Order after Conflict, Policy Report, draft, 2006. 
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a) Intrusiveness dilemma: Overly intrusive policy- and decision-making by 
external actors tends to alienate local stakeholders. Less intrusive measures 
may not suffice to stabilize a post-conflict situation. 
b) Dependency dilemma: Establishing sustainable local structures and 
capacities requires long-term external commitment. Yet long-term 
international involvement and assistance tend to create local dependencies 
on external support. 
c) Transition dilemma: International peacebuilding activity should cooperate with 
local actors and should be based on existing structures and traditions from the 
very beginning. However, traditional power structures and mentalities often 
cause or contribute to the outbreak of a given conflict. External peacebuilders 
thus face a dilemma in selecting local partners. They should be cautious in 
relying on traditional elites and try to transform their attitudes and behavior. 
The above mentioned dilemmas are well-suited to support the analysis of the difficulties of 
putting the concept of local ownership into practice. Together with the discussion on 
defining local ownership and on the patterns of interaction between external and internal 
actors, they sum up the current state of the debate on local ownership. 
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3.  Ownership in Practice: Rule of Law 
3.1  Two Conflicting Interests in International Rule of Law Assistance 
In his 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional justice, the UN Secretary-General 
emphasized the importance of restoring and respecting rule of law for post-conflict 
peacebuilding and underlined the need to reach local ownership in this context.36 In 
general, new institutions and legal systems are only perceived as legitimate if they have 
been established and adopted in consideration of local structures, norms, and traditions. 
They can only function effectively and sustainably if local actors regard them as useful and 
take over responsibility for managing them. 
But the Secretary-General also pointed out a conflicting interest in international rule of law 
assistance: the promotion of international norms and standards including international 
human rights law and criminal law.37 Often, it is the very “local owners” of rule of law-
relevant institutions who are responsible for human rights violations and the deplorable 
state of justice and security structures.38 If post-conflict societies violate these norms, the 
international community may intervene and reform relevant domestic systems and 
institutions without the will of the local government and other pertinent actors. No guidance 
is provided in the above mentioned report of the Secretary-General on how the two 
potentially conflicting interests of promoting international norms and standards and of 
facilitating local ownership are to be prioritized or reconciled. In fact, it rests upon the 
specific post-conflict peace operation to strike the right balance.39 
It makes a significant difference in this context whether a peace operation has an 
executive mandate like UNMIK or a non-executive mandate like UNMIL. For the purpose of 
implementing Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK was empowered to issue 
legislative acts and “may change, repeal or suspend existing laws to the extent necessary 
for the carrying out of [its] functions, or where existing laws are incompatible with the 
mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civil administration.”40 These provisions gave 
UNMIK a far-reaching executive and legislative mandate that stands in contradiction to the 
notion of local ownership. However, the latter principle comes into play indirectly as UNMIK 
is obliged to respect the applicable domestic law “insofar as it does not conflict with 
internationally recognized human rights standards or with previous UNMIK regulations.”41 
Further, local ownership is implied in UNMIK’s mandate to establish self-governing 
institutions and to carry out corresponding capacity-building.42 
In contrast, UNMIL only has a mandate to assist the Liberian government in reestablishing 
national authority, including a functioning administrative structure, and “in developing a 
strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and 
judicial and correctional institutions.”43 With respect to human rights, UNMIL, unlike 
                                                                              
36  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, August 23, 2004, paras. 64 (a) and 17. 
37  Ibid., para. 9. 
38  Cf. S. Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations,” in 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1 (2007) 1: p. 7; E. Scheye and G. Peake, “Unknotting Local Ownership,” in 
After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local 
Ownership, ed. A. H. Ebnöther and P. H. Fluri, Vienna and Geneva, 2005, p. 236. 
39  S. Vig, “The Conflictual Promises of United Nations’ Rule of Law Assistance: Challenges for Post-Conflict Societies,” 
in Journal of International Peacekeeping 13 (2009) 1-2: p. 155. 
40  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc. 
S/1999/779, July 12, 1999, para. 39. 
41  Ibid., para. 36. 
42  Ibid., paras. 79-81. 
43  Security Council S/Res. 1509, para. 3 (p) and (q), September 19, 2003. 
17 
 
UNMIK, is not responsible for the protection of human rights, but merely required “to 
contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights […] within 
UNMIL’s capabilities and under acceptable security conditions […].”44 Executive and 
legislative responsibility rests with the Liberian government. Thus local ownership can be 
presumed in principle. However, the question of local ownership remains an issue in the 
light of potential domination of international expertise or possible conditionality of 
international aid. 
 
3.2  Scope of Rule of Law-related Research 
The United Nations defines the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”45 Irrespective 
of the necessity to apply a comprehensive approach to the rule of law, it is the “justice 
triad” consisting of the police, courts, and prisons that receives most attention in post-
conflict rule of law assistance.46 Underling the close linkage between rule of law and the 
justice system, the UN Secretary-General stated that the creation of an independent, 
impartial, and multiethnic judiciary was the “guarantor” of a “genuine rule of law.”47 
Research economy required that this study focuses on rule of law in the narrow sense, i.e., 
the justice system. As the judiciary lies at the heart of the justice system, interviews 
primarily focused on judicial institution-building, i.e., the appointment of judges and 
prosecutors; justice-related lawmaking, including criminal law and traditional justice; and 
capacity-building activities in the justice sector. An examination of international policing 
and police reform as well as of prison management and prison reform was deemed to go 
beyond the scope of the study. The police service and the correctional system have thus 
not been made research topics although they constitute essential components of post-
conflict rule of law programs. 
 
3.3  Anticyclical Justice Strategies 
Approaches to rule of law are closely linked to governance as such. It is therefore 
surprising to observe that in terms of local ownership the international engagement in 
justice reform was anti-cyclical to the general governance strategy of both missions. In 
Kosovo, UNMIK governance was in principle geared toward more local ownership by 
successively moving from absolutist emergency-ruling in the immediate post-conflict phase 
in 1999; to the attempt of joint governance by the Joint Interim Administrative Structure 
(JIAS) from late 1999 to early 2001; to a power-sharing arrangement with Kosovo’s 
                                                                              
44  Ibid., para. 3 (l). 
45  Ibid., para. 6. 
46  J. Stromseth, D. Wippman, and R. Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military 
Interventions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 184. For a sound overview of different agendas 
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Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) formed by the Constitutional Framework 
in 2001; to the increased transfer of reserved powers to the PISG with UNMIK assuming a 
monitoring role from 2006–2007 onward.48 
Kosovo’s justice sector, however, went the opposite way: Initially, there was much local 
ownership in the pivotal judicial appointment process, in adjudication as well as concerning 
the choice of the applicable law.49 But from 2000 onward, international control significantly 
increased by introducing a body responsible for the appointment and removal of judges 
and prosecutors – the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council – with an international 
voting majority; by inserting an international judiciary that could overrule its Kosovar 
counterpart in war crimes and other politically sensitive cases; by establishing a new Pillar 
I with the objective to take a hard-line approach in maintaining law and order; and by 
making use of a legislative competence exclusively reserved for the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).50 Only from 2005 onward, in response to 
the March riots, did UNMIK start transferring the most significant justice-related 
responsibilities to a newly created Kosovo Judicial Council and Ministry of Justice. 
In Liberia, the relationship between UNMIL’s general governance strategy and the 
approach taken in the justice sector was somewhat similar. Given the total breakdown of 
public security after the civil war, there was increased UNMIL involvement from the 
beginning of the mission in 2003 until the end of the Transitional Government in early 
2006.51 The international military and police played – and still play – a significant role in 
maintaining law and order. One UNMIL staff member even argued that UNMIL should have 
been set up as an executive mission.52 However, after the elections and the formation of 
the new government, UNMIL’s role shifted from policy initiation and implementation to 
assistance and support. Despite UNMIL’s increased focus on post-conflict rule of law, the 
judicial sector was neglected for various reasons including a lack of funds as well as 
personnel problems within UNMIL and the Liberian government.53 Only in 2007–2008, 
when UNMIL already started thinking about scaling down, did justice reform become a 
priority – efforts were stepped up to push the main local actors to develop a 
comprehensive rule of law strategy, to increase judicial efficiency, and to fight harmful 
traditional practices.54 
 
3.4  Basic Understandings of Local Ownership 
Asked what they understood the meaning of local ownership to be, many interviewees 
commented on local ownership as both a process and an outcome. They found that local 
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ownership aims to achieve local appropriation of international ideas and systems as well 
as a local takeover of institutional responsibilities. Besides a gradual handover of planning 
and management competencies for newly created institutions, interviewees pointed to local 
participation in relevant decision-making processes and sufficient capacity-building as the 
main means to achieve a local “buy-in” to international interventions.55 
The approaches to achieve local ownership significantly differ depending on whether the 
mission has an executive mandate or not. As UNMIK bore full governance responsibility in 
Kosovo, it was much more preoccupied with regulatory processes and executive decision-
making than the assistance mission UNMIL, which generally placed more emphasis on 
monitoring, technical advice, and training of relevant professionals. Thus it is not surprising 
that, with respect to the means directed at local ownership in the justice sector, most 
interviewees in Kosovo focused on various aspects of transfer of responsibilities and local 
participation in regulatory processes whereas in relative terms there was more emphasis 
on capacity-building including legal education in Liberia. 
When describing their experiences with local ownership, most interview partners 
commented around three broad themes: institution-building (with special focus on transfer 
of responsibilities into local hands as well as on issues relating to local acceptance and 
international intervention), local participation, and capacity-building. 
 
3.5  Institution-building, Local Acceptance, and International Intervention 
In many post-conflict situations, the vetting and (re-)appointment of judges and prosecutors 
is one of the most urgent and important activities in justice reform. In particular in Kosovo, 
the judicial appointment process is an interesting case in terms of judicial institution-
building and subsequent transfer of responsibility. Initially in 1999, local majority voting in 
the UNMIK bodies was responsible for the selection of judges and prosecutors (i.e., the 
Joint Advisory Council on Judicial Appointments and the Advisory Judicial Commission). In 
2001, however, the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council supplanted this system and 
gave its international members a majority over their Kosovar counterparts. Only in 2006 
appointment responsibility was returned to the Kosovars (i.e., the Kosovo Judicial Council), 
but combined with an imposed reappointment and vetting process to ensure judicial quality 
and to transform existing temporary appointments into permanent ones. 
On the institutional level, one can notice a gradual transfer of responsibilities into local 
hands – or in other words, a gradual movement toward local ownership. Yet many 
interviewees argued that local ownership remains incomplete as long as UNMIK retains 
ultimate authority.56 They claimed that the notion of local ownership cannot be reconciled 
with an executive mandate. However, this finding is qualified by the fact that no matter 
whether there was formal international dominance, the actual appointments were all based 
on local recommendations following a transparent appointment process.57 In fact, no case 
is known where any judge or prosecutor was appointed against the will of the local 
interview and selection panels. 
The conclusion can be drawn that most Kosovars do regard Kosovo’s judiciary as theirs, 
although it was appointed by the quasi-absolutist SRSG and although it is heavily criticized 
for its inefficiency and corruption.58 There is local concern with the judiciary, which is why 
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both Kosovo’s politicians and public appreciate the reappointment process, although it was 
one of UNMIK’s last structural interventions on the basis of the much disliked reserved 
powers.59 
In Liberia, on the other hand, there is generally much less local interest in the justice 
system, although local ownership cannot be questioned on the basis of undue international 
influence or domination. UNMIL gave some limited assistance in the vetting and 
appointment of the judiciary, but the Liberian Government and Bar Association clearly 
maintained responsibility and control over the process.60 Liberian institutions and politicians 
generally stand behind the system and fight for their interests in it. 
However, with respect to the acceptance of newly built institutions, one of the main 
questions is: Who is the relevant local counterpart? When it comes to judging local 
ownership of the newly appointed judiciary, is it local politicians, experts, and stakeholders 
or the general public that matter? Does local ownership exist if local politicians and 
stakeholders are content with the establishment of a judicial appointment body in which 
they have the majority? Or should one only speak about local ownership if the majority of 
the population has sufficient faith in the judiciary and actually uses it? 
The fact that 80 percent of the Liberian territory and people are left outside the formal 
justice system makes local ownership in Liberian justice reform very doubtful. The majority 
of the population does not have access to the courts and prefers to settle its disputes 
traditionally.61 With respect to the Liberian judiciary, it is therefore more accurate to speak 
of “national ownership” rather than “local ownership.” Accordingly, some interviewees 
found that (real) local ownership denotes ownership by the people and on the local level, 
whereas national ownership relates to the state and its institutions on the national level.62 
To foster local ownership in this sense, it can be argued that UNMIL should have been 
more interventionist and should have increased efforts to ensure access to justice, to fight 
judicial corruption and inefficiency, to invest in legal education, and to work toward a fairer 
distribution of resources between Liberia’s urban and rural populations.63 Given the lack of 
interest in such measures by large parts of the Americo-Liberian elite, the question should 
be posed whether an executive mandate would have helped UNMIL to promote (real) local 
ownership in the justice sector. 
When and on what grounds did the two missions step into the respective domestic 
systems against the will of most/many politicians and stakeholders? In Kosovo, as 
mentioned, there was much local autonomy in the justice sector at the outset. But when it 
became clear that this policy led to ethnic bias and unfair trials, to bad-quality judgments 
and case backlogs, to corruption and security threats, UNMIK intervened and inserted the 
international judiciary with jurisdiction for war crimes and high-profile cases relating to 
ethnic discrimination and organized crime.64 
With its executive mandate, UNMIK could easily step in and argue that the situation was so 
intolerable that local ownership could not be granted. Focusing less on politicians and 
judicial stakeholders and more on the general public, UNMIK could also justify its 
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intervention on the basis of local ownership: Some UNMIK officials, for example, argued 
that Kosovars would generally only appreciate and “own” the judicial system if it worked 
efficiently and impartially.65 In other words, a local ownership strategy would require 
increased international intervention for a transitional period. 
The assistance mission UNMIL could not do this. Lacking leverage over the Liberian 
government, it could only talk and “negotiate its way through.”66 In many areas of concern it 
tried to persuade the relevant Liberian officials to come together and initiate necessary 
policy changes. Lacking in funds, it could not do the necessary capacity-building work to 
increase access to justice, in particular in rural areas. Only in a few cases of obvious and 
grave human rights violations, it strongly supported – against the will of traditional 
structures – “progressive” initiatives such as a new Rape Law which raised the age of 
consent to 18 years or a public campaign against harmful traditional practices involving 
witchcraft and trial by ordeal.67 
 
3.6  Local Participation and Legal Reform 
The second main issue is local participation in relevant decision-making processes. In 
particular for executive missions, local participation in legislative efforts is seen as one of 
the main means to achieve local ownership of new systems or institutions. Generally, most 
interviewees found that effective local participation should start as early as possible, i.e., 
during the planning phase and should not be just formal and perfunctory. To be 
meaningful, local and international partners should consult on an equal footing requiring 
sufficient language services and flexibility in procedures.68 Furthermore, international 
consultants should know the local legal traditions and should refrain from pushing through 
international blueprints.69 
However, UNMIK practice often looked quite different. As Kosovo’s judicial sector largely 
fell into UNMIK’s reserved power domain, there was hardly any Kosovar participation in the 
drafting processes for most justice-related UNMIK regulations. Although the Constitutional 
Framework was proclaimed as a measure to increase local responsibility and ownership, in 
reality locals lost their participatory rights in the justice sector.70 
Effective and comprehensive local participation in UNMIK lawmaking was difficult for 
numerous reasons.71 Among them was a lack of adequate translation and interpretation 
resources. Legal experts needed to work simultaneously in Albanian, Serbian, and English, 
and qualified translators and interpreters were difficult to find. Not only did they ideally 
need to be fluent in the three languages, but they should also have had a legal 
background. Candidates with such qualifications hardly existed and were difficult to attract. 
Since UNMIK’s central Language Unit was chronically overloaded with work, significant 
delays in the finalization of official translations of regulations were not uncommon. 
Differing legal approaches of the involved international and domestic actors were a further 
factor that made fruitful cooperation difficult. Although UNMIK was in principle obliged to 
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respect the domestic law and legal traditions, it found it difficult to do so because its staff 
lacked for the most part sufficient knowledge of the local languages, structures, and legal 
systems.72 UNMIK employed numerous international jurists whose legislative approaches 
significantly differed from domestic regulatory activity in many countries. Legislation drafted 
by international lawyers tends to use unspecific terms and to allow for flexible 
implementation. This contrasts sharply with Kosovo’s civil law-based system which is 
influenced by a socialist heritage and relies on detailed codification in the administrative 
area. In a similar way, many of the international consultants – particularly those from 
common law systems such as the United States and the United Kingdom – faced serious 
challenges in trying to match their legal language to the Kosovar legal culture.73 Finally, 
problems also resulted from the dual role of the international staff as, on the one hand, 
international civil servants and, on the other, as temporary quasi-government officials. 
Uncertaincies resulted not only from the fact that UN staff is usually not trained in 
governmental activities such as legislative drafting or building state institutions. The dual 
role also entailed potentially conflicting responsibilities and UNMIK staff was left without 
guidance on how to reconcile or prioritize them.74 
Despite these difficulties, UNMIK tried to involve local stakeholders seriously in two justice-
related legislative undertakings. The first began in the early stages of the mission and 
concerned the drafting of a new Provisional Criminal Code and Provisional Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The second project coincided with the transition process toward 
increased Kosovar responsibility in the justice sector and concerned consultations relating 
to a new Law on Courts and Law on Prosecutors and, in a wider sense, also to the UNMIK 
regulation establishing the Kosovo Judicial Council. Both drafting projects included local 
stakeholders (mostly experts, not politicians) as a driving force from the outset.75 
Consultants did not unduly dominate the process. Working groups did convene for several 
years continuously. They were endowed with sufficient language support and with 
extensive comparative expertise on different legal and judicial systems.76 
In particular, the Provisional Code of Criminal Procedure has been criticized for various 
reasons including its use of ambiguous language from international legal instruments – 
which does not fit the civil law context and for which no commentaries exist – and for 
introducing new principles without providing for the necessary implementing legislation.77 
Moreover, criticism was raised that the code did not work well in practice because it unduly 
mixes civil and common law principles and applies unrealistically high standards to 
Kosovo’s underdeveloped justice system.78 
One international judge stated that the two codes were the best examples of local 
ownership, but also caused huge problems within the local legal system.79 Certainly, many 
Kosovar politicians and legal professionals like the codes despite their implementation 
challenges because they represent an important break with the past.80 The codes are 
understood as being genuinely Kosovar in spite of the fact that they were developed under 
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reserved-power auspices. It seems that the statement by one UNMIK official that “the 
Kosovars were happy with anything, as long as it was not Serb”81 disregards the genuine 
and considerate efforts to achieve a modern penal law reform that takes into consideration 
existing legal traditions.82 The insertion of adversarial elements alien to Kosovo’s criminal 
law system was seen as something “progressive” and was strongly supported by the local 
legal experts in charge of the drafting process.83 Yet it was also welcomed because the 
prevailing civil law traditions were associated with the hated former Serb regime.84 
In Liberia, UNMIL also became involved in various justice-related legislative projects such 
as the Law on Financial Autonomy of the Judiciary, a new Jury Law, a revised Rape Law, 
and a law establishing a Law Reform Commission. It faced a Liberian government that 
emphasized national ownership and rejected strong outside influence even though it did 
not always produce sound reform projects itself. Thus UNMIL was left to support 
lawmaking processes in more subtle ways, for example by bringing together drafting 
groups as well as providing logistical and technical support, preferably by Africans and not 
by Westerners.85 In several cases UNMIL set the agenda, wrote important background 
papers, and drafted legal texts, but remained in the background. UNMIL tried as much as 
possible to avoid giving the impression of influencing the process too much and claiming 
ownership (and credit) for certain projects.86 Even in cases where the lawmaking process 
was blocked, UNMIL only pushed softly, for example by persistently raising crucial issues 
at prominent meetings. One example is the Law Reform Commission which was to 
overcome the prevailing legal pluralism by harmonizing the statutory and the customary 
legal systems. While international influence was at times exerted by threatening to 
dissuade donors to continue funding in case local cooperation was missing, overall UNMIL 
did not make international aid conditional on progress in reform. 
In terms of familiarity with the domestic legal system, technical assistance by UNMIL was 
easier in comparison to UNMIK’s legislative activity since the Liberian legal system uses 
the English language and is based on US legal traditions. Moreover, many Americo-
Liberians are proud of their relationship to the United States that involved the drafting of 
Liberian laws by US elite institutions such as Yale and Cornell University.87 Interviewees 
observed that hardly any capacity-building took place in such lawmaking and noted that 
Liberian legal stakeholders often look up to their US colleagues and ask for their 
expertise.88 Moreover, the Liberian legal system contains a “reception statute” according to 
which US and British common law is applicable if a subject matter is not regulated by 
Liberian law.89 
 
3.7  Capacity-building, Mentoring, and Co-location 
Capacity-building is seen as the other main means to achieve local ownership. In the 
justice sector, this consisted mainly of training for the judiciary and relevant stakeholders, 
technical advice for and mentoring of local officials, and in the case of UNMIL, the 
secondment of private lawyers to the Liberian prosecutorial services. 
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In Kosovo, the OSCE-led Pillar III for Democratization and Institution-building bore primary 
responsibility for the training of judges, prosecutors, and other justice-related professions 
and related activities. In 2000, the OSCE established a Judicial Training Institute and other 
legal resource centers. In Liberia, similar programs were set up from the start of the 
mission. However, with respect to systematic judicial training, progress was only made with 
the establishment of the training institute in 2008. To improve results, training was 
increasingly provided in both Kosovo and in Liberia by local rather than international 
trainers. Moreover, training sessions focused more and more on concrete legal problems 
instead of abstract human rights standards.90 
Capacity-building is also done through on-the-job training and mentoring. Pointing at the 
OSCE’s capacity-building mandate and its own shortage of staff, the UN-led administration 
of justice – i.e. the Pillar II Department of Judicial Affairs during JIAS times and from 2001, 
Pillar I’s Department of Justice – did capacity-building mainly in the form of on-the-job 
training and learning by doing.91 Although there was a gradual increase of local 
responsibilities in general, it remained mission policy – even after the establishment of the 
PISG – to maintain ultimate international authority, but to leave the implementation to the 
Kosovars.92 While the JIAS attempted to manage judicial affairs in a co-governing structure 
with an international and a local co-head, international dominance persisted and was 
increased with the creation of Pillar I.93 Although the Constitutional Framework entailed the 
rhetoric of “partnership,” “local ownership” and “self-government”, in reality legal initiatives 
or policy-related matters – in particular in the justice and police sectors – were rarely 
discussed with or even disclosed to local officials and institutions.94 As a consequence, 
policies were instituted that followed international not local priorities. 
There were fields in the justice sector where Kosovars were involved in executive decision-
making, for example in the appointment of judges and prosecutors and also with respect to 
court administration and other technical and financial matters carried out by the Ministry of 
Public Services.95 In other areas UNMIK consulted local staff with respect to concrete 
problems or to obtain information on local history and structures.96 While consultation in 
general increased, local expertise was not always used fully and there are many instances 
where the local input provided was not included in the final policy product.97 
Internationals argue that cooperation with local staff was often difficult because of 
insufficient professional skills and a biased ethno-political outlook.98 In fact, most Kosovo 
Albanians who had been expelled from public institutions had not practiced their profession 
since 1989. As a consequence, their experience with modern administrative structures and 
a post-socialist legal system was limited and their technical and managerial skills often 
outdated. In addition, many Kosovars had been traumatized by the recent history and 
vehemently opposed any conciliating policy toward the minority ethnic group. This 
obstructed UNMIK’s efforts to maintain a multiethnic Kosovo as envisaged by Security 
Council Resolution 1244. In addition, qualified local counterparts were very difficult to 
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attract because of the extremely low salaries offered to local public servants in comparison 
to private sector employees. 
Employing local legal experts as National Professional Officers (NPOs) would have 
improved this situation since their salaries were approximately four times higher than those 
paid by the JIAS and PISG respectively. However, the UNMIK Department of Justice was 
only assigned three NPOs, of which two left UNMIK in 2002 without the vacancies being 
filled.99 Realizing the potential of young, talented law graduates, the department’s Legal 
Policy Division developed an innovative scheme to involve some internationally versatile 
Kosovars in international judicial cooperation and transborder cases. They were paid the 
regular PISG salary for legal assistants, but a mentoring program and the job title as “legal 
officer” motivated them to work hard and to take on significant professional 
responsibilities.100 They received some international training on legal drafting and EU 
standards, but were required to go through a steep learning curve, for example by writing 
complex memos in short periods of time with limited supervision in English only. According 
to the UNMIK official in charge, one-third of the graduates failed, but the successful 
remainder was able to take over full responsibility.101 
Younger Kosovars with a recent law education generally found it easier to work with the 
international administration than their older colleagues.102 On the one hand, they criticized 
international incompetence and disrespect for local priorities and traditions, in particular in 
the legislative realm.103 But on the other hand, they also realized the above mentioned lack 
of professional skills and motivation of their older colleagues and local politicians and they 
appreciated that the international community exposed them to alternative management 
cultures.104 They deplored that UNMIK transferred powers to senior but inexperienced 
Kosovars whose sole interest was to stay in power and to cover up their incompetence by 
using international consultants.105 
Older Kosovars often professed a more critical view on the ways UNMIK included locals in 
its decision-making. They often found that UNMIK was not interested in sharing or even 
transferring responsibilities into local hands. Instead internationals wanted to hold on to 
their power and were unwilling to lose their job in a “five-star mission.”106 A former local 
UNMIK staff member claimed that UNMIK did not care for any capacity-building and 
merely used local staff as a “fig leaf” for local participation and power-sharing. UNMIK 
seemed to have welcomed local contributions as long as they did not challenge 
international positions and dominance. But as soon as locals reached for real 
responsibility, their input was rejected by their international colleagues who often exhibited 
a condescending or missionary attitude.107 It was also observed that in general cooperation 
between internationals and locals functioned better regarding technical issues than with 
regard to politically sensitive matters.108 
Irrespective of whether these criticisms are well-founded or not, UNMIK – like the OSCE 
with respect to the Kosovo Judicial Institute – did not engage in much capacity-building for 
the newly created Ministry of Justice and the Kosovo Judicial Council. In line with its 
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general policy to leave the implementation to the Kosovars, UNMIK quickly withdrew and 
left these institutions to themselves.109 
Mentoring and on-the-job training also played a role in the context of the international 
judiciary. Capacity-building of the local judiciary was one of the justifications used for 
inserting international judges and prosecutors into Kosovo’s judicial system.110 Coaching 
and learning from international experiences were to take place in mixed panels and in the 
preparatory work for court cases. With the exception of Pristina, local and international 
judges were co-located in the District Court buildings and the local judiciary was to learn 
from their international colleagues through osmosis (the “tea bag” theory).111 In 2005, the 
international judges and prosecutors were withdrawn from the regions and forced to 
commute to the District Courts from Pristina for concrete investigations or trials. UNMIK 
justified this move which effectively ended any potential capacity-building by a lack of 
funds for adequate language services and for implementation of an adequate mentoring 
strategy.112 Some cases of misconduct also prompted UNMIK to ensure better oversight by 
concentrating the international judiciary in Pristina. 
Except with respect to the Kosovo Special Prosecutors Office (KSPO) mentioned below, 
UNMIK found the idea of capacity-building both too expensive and too idealistic. Besides 
continuous top-quality language services, proper mentoring and coaching would have 
required the international judge or prosecutor “to learn how to walk in the local judge’s [or 
prosecutor’s] shoes” and to take sufficient time to understand what the real challenges and 
stakes of the local judiciary are.113 But this could not happen in a situation in which 
international judges were “parachuted” into a local justice system and were expected to 
work under pressure without having received any previous training on the domestic laws, 
traditions, and structures.114 Cooperating closely with each other would also have required 
much personal energy and time which most international judges and prosecutors were not 
willing to invest. Having to cope with a heavy workload, they preferred to do their cases in 
an expedient manner alone.115 Moreover, the very usefulness of a mentoring and coaching 
program for the judiciary was doubted: International judges found that “mentoring, 
monitoring and coaching would be equal to patronizing” and that local judges would not 
care to have a “babysitter.”116 It was also observed that the idea of mentoring judges would 
contradict the principle of judicial independence.117 
Instead of being engaged as capacity-builders for their local counterparts, UNMIK and the 
majority of international judges and prosecutors understood their task as being to 
safeguard international human rights standards in special high-profile cases involving 
politically sensitive issues or organized crime.118 Although the international judiciary was 
constituted as an integral part of the domestic judicial system, it de facto operated as a 
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parallel justice system.119 Although the relevant legislation concerning the international 
judiciary foresaw mixed staffing of trials, which involved both international and local judges 
as one option, cases were normally heard separately either by internationals or by locals. 
International judges decided mostly in purely international trials.120 There was not much 
room for the exchange of opinions and experiences in mixed trials either. As Pristina-
based international judges arrived shortly before the beginning of a trial and left directly 
after, there was not even a proper exchange of opions and experiences in mixed panels.121 
Similarly, there was not much cooperation between international and local prosecutors 
(outside the KSPO) either.122 
The attitude of local judges and prosecutors to the international judiciary was ambiguous. 
Although Kosovars rejected the international judicial intervention – in particular with 
respect to those panels with a majority of international judges – as an infringement on their 
sovereignty and judicial independence, many local judges and prosecutors appreciated the 
chance to share different experiences and to learn from their international counterparts. 
This concerned in particular mixed panels if the decisions were taken jointly and on an 
equal footing.123 At the same time, they complained about insensitive and arrogant 
behavior of their international colleagues and disliked various aspects of their involvement 
including the random case allocation and their lack of accountability. Yet overall, the local 
judiciary seemed to have accepted the international judiciary, also realizing the advantage 
that the latter took the pressure off of them to decide in difficult and potentially dangerous 
cases.124 
Following years of relative neglect of the prosecutorial services in comparison to the 
courts,125 a different approach was taken in the recently established KSPO, an office in 
which co-located local and international prosecutors worked side by side to prosecute the 
most serious criminal offences including “cases of organized crime, corruption, criminal 
offences motivated by race, national or ethnic background, or religion, terrorism and 
trafficking in persons, in accordance with the applicable law.”126 The explicit purpose of the 
KSPO is capacity-building in the Office of the Public Prosecutor through training and 
mentoring of special prosecutors. Training is mainly provided by “on-the-job training by 
assisting and working under the direction of international prosecutors on investigations and 
prosecutions in their field of competence.”127 Using a train-the-trainers rationale, it is 
envisaged that the international involvement will gradually decrease placing responsibility 
into the hands of the trained special prosecutors.128 While in the first year (“transitional 
phase I”), international prosecutors lead and have ultimate responsibility for the 
investigations and prosecutions, in the second transitional phase it is local special 
prosecutors who may assume primary responsibility with international prosecutors acting in 
a monitoring and advising capacity.129 
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Although international primary responsibility and authority is criticized in general terms on 
the political level, the cooperation within the KSPO seems to work well.130 Kosovar special 
prosecutors work on their cases and consult their international colleagues when 
necessary.131 With sufficient language services at their disposal, international and local 
special prosecutors meet two to three times per week to discuss relevant matters including 
strategic issues as well as detention questions and interrogation techniques. Trying to 
combine ultimate responsibility with effective capacity-building, international prosecutors 
try to apply a “soft managerial touch” according to which work is organized in a cooperative 
way.132 It has been observed that the cooperation between local and international 
prosecutors works better than between local and international judges because prosecutors 
are used to team work in an executive environment, whereas judges spend more time 
deliberating and working on files on their own.133 Although it was still too early to judge the 
KSPO properly, a relevant UNMIK official was “cautiously hopeful” that the KSPO would 
serve as a model for local and international cooperation in the justice sector.134 
A primary capacity-building activity in Liberia was to co-locate UNMIL staff to local partner 
institutions. International staff members were to cooperate closely with local actors and to 
advise and mentor them in their activities.135 One co-located UNMIL staff member 
observed that co-location is a very important strategy with many benefits, but that it also 
holds risks. If the co-located person demonstrates to the local partner institution that he or 
she is a humble and mature individual who is pursuing the latter institution’s interests, local 
partners would view the co-located as “part of the family.” Provided that local dignity is 
maintained, it was thus much easier to transform international thinking into local ideas and 
to get the approval for relevant programs and projects. On the other hand, the interviewee 
mentioned above stated that a co-located person who appeared to be very pompous and 
arrogant could do much harm to the cooperation between the institutions. 
Whereas the Ministry of Justice and the legislature appreciated the support of co-located 
UNMIL staff members, the Chief Justice was more reluctant to accept an international 
officer on his premises. An argument over the appropriate refurbishment and equipment of 
the office space assigned to the UNMIL official to be co-located to the judiciary delayed 
actual co-location until 2008, although co-location was proclaimed an official mission 
policy. Only a few months later, the SRSG decided to reduce the co-location scheme and 
to withdraw UNMIL staff from the local partner institutions. The scheme was ended for 
several reasons: With the co-located staff members spending nearly all of their time at the 
local partner institutions, UNMIL superiors found that there was a lack of accountability of 
the co-located persons to their home offices.136 Moreover, it was noted that local partner 
institutions used the co-located UNMIL staff too often as a cheap labor force to complete 
assignments on their behalf.137 Given the variety of possible assignments, UNMIL also felt 
that a stronger linkage of the co-located persons to their headquarters was necessary to 
ensure that a UNMIL staff member with matching skills for a given task was sent to the 
local partner institution.138 Another interviewee stated that the co-location scheme was 
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ended because “it did not work.”139 Mentoring should not take place at headquarters, but 
rather at the county level where most practical work was carried out. 
However, despite the rhetoric, the co-location scheme did not end entirely, but was 
reduced to the usage of “focal points” who commuted between UNMIL and their national 
counterpart.140 Instead of having an office there, formerly co-located staff now visit the local 
partner institutions three or four times per week and work there with a laptop computer for 
part of the day.141 
Although local stakeholders strongly emphasized national sovereignty and generally 
refused to accept any outside imposition, international UNMIL and NGO staff noted that in 
many cases Liberian officials de facto did not take an active role in policymaking, law 
drafting, and other relevant work.142 In particular on the working level, locals were said to 
be reluctant to sit in the driver’s seat and to accept responsibility. This situation left 
international partners to either push softly for local action and to risk a lack of progress in a 
given reform process or to do much substantive work themselves, but to risk the reproach 
of international domination. There were instances when internationals and locals jointly 
developed certain projects over a period of time. At some point in the process, the minister 
would storm in, claim that he was in charge, and propose a certain course of action in 
complete disregard of the previous work. Afterwards, the subordinates were left to 
complete the job without having the capacity and would turn again to the international 
officers to provide the required expertise or policy recommendations. The subordinates 
would welcome the input, follow the international officers’ ideas, and then submit the 
document for approval by the minister.143 
 
3.8  Conclusions: Local Ownership and Rule of Law 
The first conclusion concerning local ownership and the rule of law is that a lot of it is a 
question of perception. In terms of local involvement, the overall governance strategy of a 
mission can be very different from the particular implementation of legislative or other 
projects. For example, looking at UNMIK’s harsh and non-participatory approach to the 
rule of law in general, one might forget that certain key judicial projects do enjoy quite 
some local appreciation and acceptance. Whether local ownership exists or not also 
depends on who is deemed to be the relevant counterpart, for example formal justice 
actors or the rural population. In this connection, the differentiation between national and 
local ownership is very useful. As most post-conflict scenarios are situated in countries of 
the Global South where the formal justice system has only limited reach, working toward 
local ownership means less “rule of law-orthodoxy” focusing on technical legal assistance 
and state-centric institutions, and more focus on legal empowerment, access to justice, 
and interaction with traditional justice mechanisms.144 
With respect to the concrete means to achieve local ownership in the justice sector, one 
can say that most interviewees in Kosovo focused on various aspects of transfer of 
responsibilities and local participation in regulatory processes, whereas in relative terms 
there was more emphasis on capacity-building in Liberia including legal education. In 
terms of actors, it seems that in comparison UNMIK policy was generally geared more 
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toward politicians, experts, and judicial stakeholders, whereas UNMIL (although it also 
adopted a state-centered approach to institution-building) needed to consider the “elephant 
in the room,” i.e. the 80 percent of the Liberian population that have been left outside the 
formal system and rely on traditional settlement mechanisms. These observations mirror 
the fact that UNMIK as an executive mission was generally more preoccupied with 
regulation, governance, and security issues than the more development-oriented 
assistance mission UNMIL. 
While there certainly has been much rhetoric and also frustration with the implementation 
of local ownership, this research shows that local ownership of newly established systems 
and institutions can be achieved if there is sufficient political will and sustainable support. 
The (re-)institution of Kosovo’s judiciary demonstrates that local ownership may even be 
reached (at least to some degree) if new institutions are set up by an executive mission 
with full governance powers. Moreover, the adoption of the Provisional Codes in Kosovo 
shows that it is possible for locals to take pride in and “own” new legislation drafted under 
international auspices. Of course, this is only if based on a sound, serious, and sustainable 
participation process in which local and international partners meet on equal terms. In such 
processes, new laws can override local legal traditions and still be welcomed – although 
they cause implementation problems and legal uncertainty, as is the case with the 
Provisional Code for Criminal Procedure. Moreover, these examples also show that 
drafting processes can serve as good on-the-job learning for legislative drafting skills, 
especially if connected with a training program as was the case with the law on courts. 
While these findings are generally positive, it should not be forgotten that the international 
intervention in Kosovo is a special case not just in terms of the abundant resources that 
UNMIK had at its disposal. Several factors contributed to the – at least partial – success of 
essential elements of the UNMIK-induced justice reform. Among them is the fact that 
before the conflict Kosovo possessed a functioning justice system that was accepted by 
the population in general. Kosovo shares European legal and institutional traditions and 
Kosovars were motivated to accept change with a view to an eventual European Union 
membership. Albanian Kosovars also welcomed many changes as an indication of 
separation from the previous Serb regime. Most post-conflict environments including 
Liberia do not enjoy such favorable conditions for an international intervention. 
In particular in more difficult environments, local participation and capacity-building entail a 
myriad of communication, knowledge, and motivation problems that can only be overcome 
or mitigated with much energy and persistence. As a basic premise, the organizations 
involved – as well as the individual staff members – must comprehend that they serve the 
local population and must duly consider local perceptions of and approaches toward 
planned reform projects. The inevitable gaps between the local and international realms 
can potentially be bridged by various strategies such as co-locating international staff into 
local government offices, by employing NPOs who are sufficiently paid, by using local or 
regional trainers and facilitators to mitigate accusations of neo-colonialism, or by engaging 
the younger generation with professional experiences and/or education abroad. 
However, the research also indicates that all of these strategies have their shortcomings 
and cannot be applied as a blueprint. For example, both UNMIK and UNMIL terminated or 
at least reduced existing co-location schemes at some point. In Kosovo, international 
judges were withdrawn from the regions partly due to a lack of resources for meaningful 
mentoring. In Liberia, UNMIL staff co-located to the ministries was withdrawn due to a lack 
of control and partial misuse by the Liberian government. In terms of NPOs, UNMIK – 
though not the OSCE – had very few of them and needed to deal with often unenthusiastic 
and insufficiently paid local professionals, whereas UNMIL was fortunate to have a larger 
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number, but was criticized for stealing the country’s few qualified lawyers. While in general 
local or regional trainers and facilitators seem to achieve better results in training sessions 
or group discussions, locals might prefer internationals to perform these tasks as 
independent and respected authorities without any linkages to the conflict. 
Creating local ownership of new institutions or systems that have been introduced in the 
course of an international intervention is a long-term and inter-generational undertaking. 
The more intervention there is, the more international actors become part of the local 
power dynamics and can be held responsible. Initiating serious changes – for example by 
empowering local reform constituencies through institutional reform –, but then quickly 
losing interest and withdrawing engagement does not just undermine international values, 
but can also cause local harm. Local ownership is not created in this way. 
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4.  Ownership in Practice: Elections 
 
4.1  Electoral Assistance in Peace Operations 
Elections are generally regarded as one precondition for the stabilization of post-conflict 
countries and the building of sustainable peace.145 As a result, international electoral 
assistance inside and outside peace operations in recent years has become a veritable 
growth industry. Since 1992 when the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) was established 
within the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA), it has been a prominent feature of 
every peace operation under the auspices of the United Nations.146 A 2005 report of the 
Secretary-General listed 47 UN electoral technical assistance missions since 1992.147 
Electoral assistance in the 1990s was mainly “event-driven”. International organizations 
focused on the successful management of a specific election in a given country and then 
turned away and became involved only shortly before the next electoral event. Activities 
tended to be short-term and ad hoc. But repetitive international electoral support in places 
like Liberia or Kosovo as well as the negative evaluation of some electoral assistance 
activities148 has led to a gradual rethinking. International actors have increasingly moved 
away from “electoral tourism”149 and toward the building of stable electoral administration 
capacities and sustainable and transparent procedures. 
Generally, international involvement in post-conflict elections can differ widely with regard 
to intensity – from very intrusive measures or total control of electoral processes to mere 
advisory functions for certain technical aspects. However, the political significance and 
delicacy of post-conflict elections and their decisive nature for the first phase of peace 
operations have frequently led the international community to take over complete 
responsibility – or at least a more than dominant role – for first-time elections. In fact, 
international actors often have been given the role of an independent and neutral election 
manager by the parties to the conflict themselves in order to avoid tensions or open 
violence during the unstable times of electoral campaigns. The two case studies chosen 
for this project provide examples from both ends of the spectrum: full control in Kosovo and 
an advisory role in Liberia. 
In Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 called for “the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants.” Elections were the reserved responsibility of 
UNMIK, delegated to the OSCE with the OSCE Head of Mission as a chairperson to the 
Central Election Commission (CEC). In total, the OSCE organized and supervised four 
elections: at the municipal level in 2000 and 2002 and at the central level in 2001 and 
2004.150 After the 2007 elections and the unilaterally declared Independence in 2008, the 
national institutions have assumed greater responsibilities for elections and taken over the 
chair of the CEC though the OSCE Electoral Division continues to assist the electoral 
management bodies. 
                                                                              
145  B. Reilly, “International Electoral Assistance. A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned,” The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” Working Paper 17, June 2003, p. 18. 
146  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization, UN Doc. 
A/60/431, October 14, 2005, para. 7. 
147  Ibid., para. 11. 
148  A. Ellis et al., “Effective Electoral Assistance. Moving from Event-based Support to Process Support,” Stockholm: 
IDEA Publications, 2006, p. 8. 
149  B. Reilly, 2003, p. 13. 
150  See the website of the OSCE in Kosovo at <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13208.html> (last visited April 9, 2010). 
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In the case of Liberia, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 
August 18, 2003, UNMIL acted as a non-partisan facilitator for the elections. The CPA 
mandated the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to request ”the United 
Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and other members of the international community 
[…] to jointly conduct, monitor and supervise the elections in the country,”151 which were to 
be held by October 2005.152 The CPA called for a reform of the existing electoral system153 
and for an independent and reconstituted National Elections Commission (NEC) which was 
required ”to operate in conformity with UN standards in order to ensure that the rights and 
interests of Liberians are guaranteed, and that the elections are organized in a manner that 
is acceptable to all.” In September 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1509 
authorizing the establishment of UNMIL. One key component of the mandate was assisting 
the transitional government “in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, 
in preparing for national elections scheduled no later than the end of 2005.”154 
 
4.2  Scope of Research on Elections 
What might be called the mechanics of an electoral process can be usefully divided into 
two main areas: the electoral system and electoral administration.155 The electoral system 
depends on legal and constitutional issues such as the choice between a presidential or 
parliamentarian system, the formula for distribution of seats, and the structure of electoral 
districts. The electoral administration covers electoral management bodies (EMBs), voter 
registration, boundary delimitation, and the like. Although electoral systems and laws are 
certainly important as they provide the overall framework, electoral administration is the 
key for implementing an electoral process in a way that reflects the will of the voters.156 
Nevertheless according to Reilly, “electoral systems have attracted a voluminous academic 
literature while issues of electoral administration remain under-studied by scholars and 
under-rated in general terms of their effect on post-conflict polities.”157 Robert A. Pastor 
comes to the same conclusion by complaining that “whatever the reason, there has been 
so little attention given to the conduct of elections that this writer found practically no 
literature on the subject of election commissions or their history.”158 Political scientists have 
for too long narrowed their approach to the subject of post-conflict elections to politics, 
parties, and proportionality, looking at constitutional questions rather than the actual 
carrying out of elections. 
Given the number of potential actors and activities in the field of electoral assistance, it 
was important to reduce the areas to be covered by the empirical work of the research 
project. Following the above reasoning and after discussions with electoral specialists and 
preliminary field research in Liberia and Kosovo in 2007, this project selected electoral 
administrations as the core research area. Specifically the main focus will be on the 
establishment and support of local EMBs. This task was in fact the core of the election-
related activities of both UNMIL and UNMIK. 
Kosovo offers a wider arrangement of electoral bodies including the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) and its Secretariat (CECS), the Municipal Election Commissions 
                                                                              
151  Article XIX of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, August 18, 2003. 
152  Ibid., Article XVIII. 
153  Ibid. 
154  S/Res. 1509 (September 19, 2003). 
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(MECs), and the Election Complaints and Appeals Commission (ECAC). Due to the fact 
that five elections were held in Kosovo during the period under consideration, the project 
was able to analyze the strategies of long-term institution-building. While the NEC in 
Liberia has always been formally in charge of the elections and no official transfer was 
needed, only partial responsibilities have been transferred from the OSCE and UNMIK to 
the CEC and its Secretariat in Kosovo between the first municipal elections in 2000 and 
the general elections at the end of 2007. The transfer of responsibilities thus constituted a 
key issue of the research in Kosovo. 
In Liberia, the research concentrated on the National Elections Commission (NEC) and its 
local branches, especially on the capacity-building measures of UNMIL’s Electoral Division 
for the NEC and local assistant and political magistrates before the 2005 elections and the 
daily cooperation of external and internal actors in this process. 
 
4.3  Electoral Management Bodies 
In Kosovo, local electoral administration bodies have evolved slowly over time after their 
establishment through UNMIK regulations. The oldest ones are the MECs which have 
existed – with different roles and responsibilities – since the first municipal elections in 
2000. MECs are integrated into the municipal structure and perform their duties 
independently, although the CEC holds the final authority. It has gone through a number of 
different formats, but has always included local stakeholders. Between 2001 and 2008, the 
OSCE Head of Mission chaired the CEC which consisted of nine local and three 
international commissioners. Political parties and minority communities appoint the local 
commissioners. The CEC makes decisions by consensus. If consensus cannot be 
reached, the chairperson – always an international – makes the final and binding 
decision.159 The Central Election Commission has a full-time Secretariat (CECS), first 
established in 2003 and staffed by civil servants. It is tasked with the actual implementation 
of the elections. Finally, the Electoral Complaints and Appeals Commission (ECAC) was 
established in different formats before each of Kosovo’s five elections – and closed again 
after each one. 
In contrast to Kosovo, the establishment of the NEC of Liberia is mandated by the 
constitution.160 Also, the CPA specifically required the NEC to be reconstituted as an 
independent entity before the elections. It thus fell to the chairman of the NTGL to 
nominate seven commissioners and an executive director/chairperson of the Commission, 
all of whom were then vetted by an independent council. Though the international 
community monitored the process, it had no official role in it and did not interfere openly. In 
that way, the NEC from the start established a strong feeling of independence toward 
UNMIL and other international agencies, even though its capacities were quite limited at 
that time.161 The NEC is responsible for the overall management of the elections including 
preparation, organization, and the adoption of all necessary measures to ensure free and 
fair elections. Eighteen sub-offices were established in the counties, each with an elections 
magistrate and a county coordinator. Additional assistant magistrates were appointed and 
trained for civic education, registration, and other electoral issues. 
 
                                                                              
159  Since independence in 2008, the Head of Mission (HoM) does not chair the CEC any longer. 
160  Article 89 of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia. 
161  Interview with former NEC Commissioner, Monrovia, November 2007. 
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4.4  The Structure and Role of UNMIK/OSCE and UNMIL 
As has already been pointed out, the roles of the two UN missions in Kosovo and Liberia 
differed considerably. UNMIK, provided with an executive mandate, was in charge of the 
electoral process, whereas UNMIL with its more limited mandate was tasked with 
supporting the NEC of Liberia. The following short description of their respective structures 
and activities will therefore reveal significant differences. 
In Kosovo, UNMIK set the dates of all elections until 2007 and used its regulatory powers 
to promulgate electoral laws and rules. Within UNMIK, the OSCE was officially tasked with 
the administration and implementation of electoral processes. It set up a Department of 
Election Development (DED)162 in 1999 which has remained in Kosovo as the OSCE 
Electoral Division, but has changed significantly over the years in size, tasks, and 
personnel. In contrast to Liberia which already had electoral structures that needed to be 
revitalized, the OSCE in Kosovo was in charge of creating new institutions, drafting laws, 
and training local personnel for the new electoral bodies. Importantly, the OSCE always 
viewed the delivery of elections in accordance with international standards as one of its 
core tasks in Kosovo.163 In addition, Kosovo elections were also at the center of 
international attention and the OSCE was fully aware that its reputation was thus at stake. 
In 2007, the self-description of the OSCE Electoral Division still declared that it was 
required to “pro-actively monitor the preparation and conduct of elections and intervene as 
necessary to prevent or remedy any potential misconduct or deviation from electoral 
rules.”164 The OSCE Electoral Division de facto was the electoral management body of 
Kosovo and acted accordingly. For years it would be a dominant partner, teacher, and 
ultimate arbiter for all local actors and the evolving local electoral bodies. Between 2000 
and 2007, the OSCE Electoral Division created and nurtured them all. 
At the CEC – the main forum for decisions on electoral laws and regulations – the various 
Heads of Mission of the OSCE165 had different levels of experience with electoral affairs 
and also applied different working styles. Some tried to create consensus on decisions, 
some used their executive powers and made independent decisions, often guided by 
requests of the OSCE Electoral Division.166 Nevertheless, the OSCE Electoral Division saw 
in 2001 already that it must address “the objective of effectively concluding the role of the 
international election staff and the takeover by national staff.”167 The overall goal was 
described as the “development of a permanent professional cadre of Kosovo election 
administrators.”168 To reach that goal, the Electoral Division applied a two-pronged 
approach: the training and support of local actors in local structures (such as MECs and 
the CECS) and the training and hiring of NPOs for the OSCE Electoral Division itself. This 
strategy – which was implemented OSCE-wide in Kosovo, but not within the other pillars of 
UNMIK – slowly turned the OSCE Electoral Division into a “Kosovarized” international 
division with more than 90 percent Kosovar staff by mid-2007. The program was seen as a 
key “to assist in the transition to national professional staff.”169 Through the daily interaction 
with international staff, the NPOs would receive specialized training and “become a 
professional election administrator functioning in a responsible position.”170 
                                                                              
162  The DED was named Department of Election Operations (DEO) in 2000, Department of Elections (DE) in 2003, and 
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Although the internal Strategic Plan of June 2001 of the Electoral Division advised a 
decreasing role for the OSCE Electoral Division in all electoral bodies and recommended a 
“Kosovarization” of these institutions by 2004 the latest, the 2004 and 2007 elections 
witnessed sharp relapses to full OSCE control. In 2007, UNMIK called for local and general 
elections against the will of the Kosovo political parties and even the OSCE itself.171 In the 
preparation of these elections, the OSCE hired 150 additional international electoral 
experts, withdrew OSCE personnel from other divisions for electoral tasks and put together 
additional “witness teams” comprised of OSCE and UNMIK personnel. As a result, the 
involvement of the local CEC and its Secretariat was even less than in 2004 – a clear 
example of how extraneous political considerations and the need to deliver “successful” 
elections for an international audience can get in the way of long-term capacity-building.172 
The dominant role of the Electoral Division only changed after Kosovo declared 
independence in 2008 when the Head of Mission withdrew from chairing the CEC and the 
Electoral Division had to move toward a more advisory function. 
Turning to Liberia, the roots of the structure and tasks of UNMIL’s electoral role go back to 
the recommendations of an international assessment team that visited the country in April 
2004. The International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES)173 was sent to Liberia on 
behalf of the EAD of the UN DPA. The team identified areas of concern such as civic and 
voter education, voter registration, constituency delimitation, and polling. It further 
concluded that the NEC would need extensive material support and capacity-building 
measures from the international community in order to be in a position to implement its 
mandate.174 
The mission even suggested that UNMIL’s support to the elections should be “robust” 
recommending the provision of a chief electoral advisor to the Commission who “could 
provide support and guidance to the National Elections Commission on the development of 
policy, procedures, and the overall management of the electoral process.”175 In addition, 
IFES advocated that the NEC should have international members to “demonstrate, in a 
highly visible way, international involvement in the electoral process.”176 The UNMIL 
leadership at the time supported this idea while Liberian counterparts at the newly formed 
NEC, which was founded two weeks after the assessment mission left the country, 
opposed it.177 Interviews with UNMIL and NEC staff revealed that especially the first SRSG 
and his deputy argued for a stronger role of UNMIL in the elections by quoting from the 
CPA that the international community should “jointly conduct, monitor and supervise.”178 
But even the head of the UNMIL Electoral Division stressed that UNMIL did not have the 
mandate to implement such measures. Nevertheless, serious tensions between the NEC 
and UNMIL occurred which were only gradually resolved by three factors: a meeting in 
Abuja moderated by ECOWAS where it was made clear that the NEC was in charge for 
the elections, a new SRSG with a different working philosophy who stressed NEC’s 
ownership of the electoral process, and a new head of the UNMIL Electoral Division who 
was able to improve the communication and cooperation between UNMIL headquarters, 
the Electoral Division, and the NEC.179 
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Furthermore, its new head decided to reform the structure of the Electoral Division so that 
it mirrored the NEC’s organizational set-up.180 According to several interviewees, this 
practical rearrangement was a strong symbol for the NEC’s ownership of the elections.181 
Additionally, it was a significant contribution to the development and maintenance of close 
cooperation between both entities through all phases of the process.182 Once fully 
deployed, UNMIL’s Electoral Division had a total staff of 585 persons made up of 24 
international civilian staff, 183 United Nations Volunteers (UNV),183 and 378 national staff 
making the Electoral Division twice as large as the NEC. 
At the county level, international County Electoral Advisors (CEAs) were assigned to each 
of the 18 County Electoral Offices. They were supported by 105 Electoral Support Officers 
(ESOs) who assisted the NEC county staff with the training of registration and polling 
personnel as well as monitoring and providing logistical support for the voter registration 
and polling process. All employees were UNVs. 
 
4.5  Interaction: Advice, Support, and Co-location 
Local ownership can only develop through interactions between international personnel 
and local partners. This interaction can occur in many shapes: when deployed international 
staff in headquarters and the field meet national actors in workshops, roundtables or other 
formats, or when international and national staff is actually co-located in the same space 
with continuous cooperation. In all these settings, both cultural sensitivity and local 
knowledge are the keys for success. Unfortunately, one result of interviews conducted in 
Kosovo was the complaint by Kosovar interviewees about a general lack of local 
knowledge on the part of international personnel recruited for Kosovo. It seems that pre-
deployment training did not include enough information on local traditions, actors, and 
processes. In addition, the quick rotation of international counterparts made it difficult to 
establish mutual trust and close working relations.184 
Interviews also showed that modes of interaction and strategies toward local partners and 
institutions differed tremendously on the municipal and central levels in Kosovo. On the 
municipal level, the OSCE successfully co-located international experts and newly 
recruited Municipal Elections Officers (MEOs) for the 2000 elections and most MEOs never 
experienced any difficulties in communicating with their OSCE counterparts.185 As they 
received more and more responsibilities from 2000 onward, they never felt dominated by 
the OSCE, but gladly accepted its permanent support and advice. Some interviewees 
explained that MEOs still saw themselves as OSCE personnel and did not think that the 
CECS had the capacities to run an election. In the 2007 elections, this led to the bypassing 
of official lines of communication when MEOs decided to communicate directly with the 
OSCE Electoral Division, but not with the Secretariat in emergencies. 
When the CECS was established in 2003, the OSCE Electoral Division provided basic 
training and capacity-building was mostly implemented through direct contacts and close 
cooperation between counterparts in each agency. The CECS was designed to actually 
mirror the structure of the OSCE Electoral Division. However, most of the Secretariat’s 
personnel left the institution after a short time. In 2007, only one person with experiences 
from the 2004 elections was still employed there. No continuity of working relationships 
                                                                              
180  Interview with former Head of UNMIL ED, New York, June 2009. 
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and physical separation in different buildings hampered communication. Personal 
animosities between the top management of both institutions led to a communication 
breakdown between 2004 and 2007 according to interviewees.186 The first instance of co-
location of OSCE and Secretariat staff occurred before the 2007 elections. Both sides 
valued the experience and thought that an early co-location in 2003 would have led to 
better results regarding the training, interaction, and institution-building of the 
Secretariat.187 
One interesting aspect of the interaction between the OSCE and the CECS are the NPOs 
at the OSCE Electoral Division. While some interviewees stressed that NPOs were the 
perfect link to the CECS whose employees rarely spoke English well enough for direct 
communication, others felt that the typically young Kosovar NPOs caused serious 
problems – not only because seniority plays a large role in Kosovo society, but also 
because the well-paid NPOs made the position of the OSCE even stronger. The head of 
the Secretariat remarked that it is almost impossible to take over responsibilities given 
such a strong counterpart as the Electoral Division with its reserved powers and extensive 
personnel and resources.188 Several interviewees stressed the negative consequences of 
this situation. Whenever the OSCE took the lead, the Secretariat leaned back and said, in 
the words of one Kosovar: “Fine, you do it, you’re better at it anyway.”189 
As in the case of Kosovo, interviewees in Liberia criticized the level of preparation of the 
international personnel before their deployment. Some UNMIL staff in 2004 seemed to 
have thought they would encounter local actors with little or no knowledge and capacities. 
These wrong assumptions and possibly other prejudices toward Liberian partners led to 
considerable tensions at several points during the mission.190 
The Electoral Division followed the IFES recommendations191 by locating its staff in the 
same building as the personnel of the NEC. Legal and electoral experts moved to the 
bottom floor while all NEC staff resided on the top floor – sending a strong message with 
this simple move that it was Liberians who were in charge of the elections.192 Both NEC 
and UNMIL interviewees saw this co-location as the single most important factor for the 
success of the elections and the general positive cooperation between Liberians and 
internationals during the electoral process.193 Generally speaking, the co-location during 
the 2005 elections constituted probably the strongest level of cooperation between external 
and internal actors UNMIL-wide. Every international expert had a direct local 
counterpart.194 
The Electoral Division held meetings every morning at the NEC building. Furthermore, 
there were bi-weekly meetings of all UNMIL sections with the NEC and international 
partners such as IFES, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic 
Institute, etc. Officially the NEC called such meetings. According to interviewees, the NEC 
always took the final decisions on what UNMIL legal experts suggested after having 
consulted with two Liberian legal counselors. Most of the time issues were discussed at a 
roundtable with the NEC having the final word. However, the UNMIL legal experts provided 
                                                                              
186  Interviews with OSCE ED staff, March 2008. 
187  Interviews with OSCE ED and CECS staff, March 2008. 
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189  Interview with OSCE Field Election Specialist, Peja, March 2008. 
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most of the suggestions and initiatives and set the agenda. Interviewees from UNMIL and 
the NEC stressed that the cooperation was professional and marked by a high degree of 
mutual respect. The former head of the Commission highlighted in a meeting with the 
research team that the role of the internationals was only supportive and that they were not 
driving the process. As a result, the local actors felt free to reject suggestions made by the 
internationals when having the feling that they were unlikely to succeed.195 
In addition, the UNMIL Electoral Division often used symbolic measures to strengthen the 
NEC’s standing and to downplay its own role. Though international staff drafted most of the 
official press statements, it was always the Commission’s spokesperson who delivered it to 
the Liberian media. The head of the Electoral Division, on the other hand, refused to be 
interviewed by either national or international media always referring to national 
commissioners because “they were in charge.”196 Residing on the bottom floor of the NEC 
building contributed to that image as well. 
Both NEC and UNMIL Electoral Division personnel stressed the high level of mutual 
respect and cultural sensitivity during the period of co-location at the NEC building. Local 
ownership was secured through the way external and internal actors communicated and 
cooperated on a daily basis. This was not based on manuals or guidelines, but mostly on 
personal decisions as well as individual work philosophies and attitudes. Many 
international employees including the former SRSG stressed the benefit of a non-executive 
mandate: Such a mandate forces a mission and its employees to be inclusive and to 
actually sell their advice and projects to their local partners.197 
On the local level, UNMIL’s initial plan for the field structure was to deploy the National 
Elections Commission magistrates at the same time as the international CEAs. Their 
deployment was, however, delayed.198 The absence of the magistrates in the counties and 
the tight timeframe of the elections forced the international CEAs to start the preparations 
for the elections from scratch and to establish contacts with local authorities and leaders 
without the involvement of their local counterparts. UNMIL personnel thought that waiting 
for the magistrates would have entailed postponing the registration period which in turn 
would have affected the remaining electoral preparations. As a result, tensions were 
created between magistrates and CEAs. The latter felt that the magistrates were not 
making a committed effort to perform their tasks, whereas the magistrates complained that 
the CEAs treated them as subordinates and tried to do their job. 
During a focus group interview with magistrates from the field, the participants recalled the 
communication problems they had with their CEAs during the electoral period:199 In the 
beginning, the international staff took a very dominant role. As they were in charge of all 
UN resources including cars and office equipment, teamwork very much depended on the 
working style and personality of the individual CEA. Many stuck to the official rules and 
limited the locals’ access to UN equipment. Others went beyond the rules and several 
even taught their counterparts computer skills in their free time. Some magistrates voiced 
their beliefs that the initial dominant behavior of their CEAs was a reflection of the overall 
policy that UNMIL’s top management had adopted during the first phase of the mission. 
Once the head of the Electoral Division and the SRSG had changed, behavior in the field 
                                                                              
195  Interview with former NEC Commissioner, Monrovia, November 2007. 
196  Interview with former Head of UNMIL ED, Accra, June, 2008. 
197  Interview with former SRSG, Monrovia, November 2007. 
198  IFES had funded a trip to Ghana for NEC magistrates to observe the December 2004 elections. Though IFES and the 
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199  Focus group interview with assistant magistrates, Monrovia, IFES Office, April 2008. 
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changed accordingly. New UNMIL teams briefed the CEAs on how to share more 
information and responsibilities with their local counterparts.200 
 
4.6  Training and Transfer of Tasks 
Joint electoral training activities represent interesting cases for local ownership in both 
countries studied by the project. Successful training is a prerequisite for the transfer of 
tasks and responsibilities. However, in interviews conducted on training and capacity-
building, national interviewees also stressed the other side of the training issue: pre-
deployment training for international actors to enable them to fulfill their tasks in an efficient 
and culturally sensitive manner. 
As mentioned above, there were clear differences in the capacity- and institution-building 
processes that the OSCE implemented on the national and municipal levels in Kosovo. On 
the latter, MEOs and the national staff of the Electoral Division of the OSCE implemented a 
program of training and gradual transfer of responsibilities. All interviewees highlighted the 
good quality of the training delivered by UNMIK, OSCE and its sub-contracted partners. 
MEOs stressed that the training over the years and the step-by-step transfer of 
responsibilities into their hands showed a clear strategy by the OSCE Electoral Division. 201 
Capacity-building started with co-location in the first elections, moved to supervision and 
then advice by the OSCE. Already in 2002, the municipal officers held sole responsibility 
for the implementation of operational plans in accordance with the OSCE’s Strategic Plan 
from 2001.202 
The same plan foresaw that the CEC, its future Secretariat and the ECAC would become 
independent by 2004 with only a limited advisory and assistance role for the OSCE. But 
the CEC and its Secretariat received only partial responsibilities for some tasks in the 2004 
general elections.203 As has been pointed out before, in 2007 the OSCE even took some of 
the transferred tasks back because it felt that the Secretariat was incapable of organizing 
the elections and that there was a serious risk of complete failure.204 According to several 
interviewees, the reasons for this outcome were a number of factors that hampered 
transfer and ownership at the central level. One was the decision by a former head of the 
Electoral Division to create a new electoral management body from scratch in 2003 instead 
of applying the “Bosnian model” of transferring NPOs from the Electoral Division of the 
OSCE to the new institution. In addition, the recruitment of staff for the CECS turned out to 
be very difficult as did maintaining trained and experienced staff at the institution. Its 
employees were much less experienced than their Kosovar counterparts at the OSCE and 
received only a tenth of their salary. Thus NPOs could not be persuaded to take a job at 
the Commission Secretariat, but remained at the OSCE.205 
While even some Kosovar NPOs at the Electoral Division were in favor of taking 
responsibility away from their CECS counterparts during the 2007 elections, most 
interviewees stressed that local ownership on the central level would have been possible 
and should have been implemented at the outset of the mission. Just as on the municipal 
level, an early and gradual transfer of tasks, co-location, and continuous training could 
have led to a better result. Co-location of the CECS and the Electoral Division first 
happened in 2007. Interviewees from both sides praised this approach and the new quality 
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of interaction, asking themselves why this had not been possible before. Nevertheless, it 
was already too late for full local responsibility for the general elections in 2007. The fear of 
the international community that the elections could fail prevented ownership on the central 
level.206 UNMIK and the OSCE rushed back into control. One interviewee said that 
especially in elections only failure enables one to learn.207 But the international community 
did not allow that to happen. 
As in Kosovo training played a large role in creating local ownership for Liberian electoral 
management bodies. The 2004 report of the IFES assessment mission had claimed that 
the technical capacities of the NEC were not sufficient.208 IFES recommended that the 
commissioners and their permanent staff had to improve their technical skills and 
knowledge through intensive external technical assistance and training. The aim was to 
build an institution that “will have the technical expertise to administer future elections 
without substantial involvement from the international community.”209 
The UNMIL Electoral Division had extensive consultations with the NEC to identify, 
formulate and reach consensus on viable procedures within the parameters of the existing 
constitutional provisions and regulations on elections, which then were incorporated into 
manuals and other training materials. The task of designing, developing and writing the 
manuals fell to the Electoral Division Training Unit. Thus most of the actual first drafting of 
the manuals was done by international staff though in close consultations with national 
counterparts. According to the NEC’s main training officer, a joint team of three 
international and three national training officers was in charge of all strategic and 
operational decisions on training at the Commission’s headquarters.210 As the international 
personnel tended to be more experienced than their counterparts, the production of the 
training manual can be seen as on-the-job training for NEC personnel. After the production 
of the manual, the headquarters team was split into three mixed teams that ran training 
centers for the international CEAs and the national assistant magistrates. The lead during 
the individual training activities was shared between the national and international training 
officers, but the internationals still managed the overall process.211 
After the 2005 elections, UNMIL stressed to the NEC that it now would have to take the full 
lead for the training for the by-elections – internationals would no longer conduct any 
training, but only observe.212 While interviewees from the NEC highlighted that from the 
first by-election onward the NEC was completely in charge of all electoral aspects with 
international personnel merely advising, former UNMIL officials saw this development only 
in the second round of the by-elections. According to them, even during the first by-election 
UNMIL and the Electoral Division did most of the work. The Commission, in their view, did 
not seem willing to take over. This changed only in the run-off of the second by-election, 
mainly because the internationals stepped back and the national counterparts were 
indirectly forced to take over.213 
There are, of course, two sides to every training process. It demands, on the one hand, the 
willingness to learn, and, on the other, the ability to teach. It seems clear that Liberian 
actors displayed the first. In its final report the Electoral Division praised the NEC: “The 
NEC, realizing the need for skills training, embraced the learning process, and participated 
                                                                              
206  Interview with Head of ED, Pristina, March 2008. 
207  Interview with Electoral Expert, Accra, June 2008. 
208  Palmer et al., 2004, p. 7. 
209  Ibid., p. 8. 
210  Interview with NEC training officer, Monrovia, April 2008. 
211  Ibid.  
212  Interview with former UNMIL ED Media Relations Advisor, Monrovia, April 2008. 
213  Ibid.  
42 
 
in the intensive training programs conducted by the Electoral Division and its partners with 
enthusiasm and diligence.”214 However, several interviewees – both national and 
international – highlighted that not all UN personnel were up to the challenge of conveying 
their knowledge.215 The impression emerges that international staff is sometimes not 
sufficiently prepared before deployment for the tasks they have to implement. They are 
also not fully trained on issues related to ownership and the handover of responsibilities. 
There further seems to be a lack of guidance by the mission leadership on these 
matters.216 Especially in electoral assistance missions, international staff is frequently only 
hired for a short time and given clear deliverables and benchmarks. Therefore, they 
sometimes tend to look toward election day, but fall short on a long-term perspective that 
could help to work toward capacity-building and local ownership. During the focus group 
interview conducted for this project, assistant magistrates stated that they learned most 
from international colleagues who were eager to learn from them and who treated them 
with respect.217 Another interviewee pointed out that international electoral experts often 
encountered extreme logistical problems and cultural difficulties which made them 
distrustful toward the local population.218 As a participant in ZIF’s 2007 expert workshop on 
local ownership already stated: “An Übermensch would be needed on both sides of the 
relationship to implement local ownership in a productive way – where both sides are 
patient, insightful, open-minded, good communicators, and are willing to learn and 
change.”219 
 
4.7  Conclusions: Local Ownership and Elections in Kosovo and Liberia 
Comparing the achievements of the electoral divisions of the two UN missions in Kosovo 
and Liberia, it must be kept in mind that elections are different from most other activities 
undertaken by a peace operation. Work in an electoral division is by necessity focused on 
a single event – election day – which must be brought off successfully under the watchful 
eye of all stakeholders.220 This event- and output-oriented approach is difficult to reconcile 
with long-term goals such as capacity-building and sustainability. In practice, it is often 
simply about “getting the job done” within tight deadlines even if that means that 
international experts quickly “type things up” for their national counterparts.221 If elections 
fail, it is always the international assistance that will be blamed – regardless of what 
approach toward local ownership was chosen.222 
Taking a closer look at the specific approaches of UNMIK and UNMIL to local ownership, it 
becomes apparent that both, mandates and personalities greatly influence outcomes. In 
over eight years UNMIK’s OSCE pillar under an executive mandate was only able to 
achieve partial local ownership. Efficient electoral structures were established on the 
municipal level, but according to interviewees UNMIK failed with the central electoral 
management bodies. The verdict of the Council of Europe after the 2007 elections – the 
fifth under UNMIK auspices – supports this view: “Formally, these elections are the 
responsibility of local institutions, primarily the CEC. However, due to the short notice, it 
became imperative that the international community, through the OSCE, take much more 
responsibility for the process than was foreseen. … [I]t seems that the international 
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community has not met its obligation to contribute to capacity-building in the field of 
elections.”223 
Lack of early planning cannot be blamed: A clear path toward the “Kosovarization” of all 
electoral bodies was laid out as early as 2001 by the OSCE Electoral Division’s Strategic 
Plan. Rather it seems that personal decisions by senior staff and external political pressure 
hindered local ownership at the central level. Some well-meaning strategies backfired. The 
hiring of locals as NPOs turned the OSCE Electoral Division itself into a “Kosovarized” 
institution, but failed to improve local ownership as NPOs refused to join the CECS.224 
Instead they preferred to remain at the Electoral Division or looked for more lucrative 
employment outside Kosovo. 
In Liberia, an altogether more positive picture with regard to the establishment of local 
ownership emerges. Both Liberian and international sources consistently praised the role 
played by the UNMIL Electoral Division which gave their local partners strong support, but 
left them in charge of the electoral process. It is probably no accident that faced with a 
mission with a non-executive mandate, Liberian actors felt free to modify or reject 
international advice – although they rarely did so. Furthermore, a number of symbolic 
measures contributed greatly to strengthening the NEC’s standing. UNMIL staff not only 
moved into the bottom floor of the NEC building, they also left the media limelight to local 
actors. These measures were not based on UN manuals or guidelines, but resulted from 
the initiative of individuals. Personalities were also responsible for making the co-location 
scheme at the NEC building successful. Local as well as international interviewees 
stressed the high level of cultural sensitivity and mutual respect that marked their shared 
working experience. 
In fact, the UNMIL Electoral Division itself acknowledges in its final report that mandates 
and personalities are decisive: “Mandates must be clarified – those responsible for 
formulating policy must stick to their assigned role […]. The level of collaboration and the 
nature of the collaboration depend largely on how well nationals and internationals, as well 
as international partners, can integrate. This should be taken into consideration as far as 
possible when recruitment for elections is conducted.”225 
When co-location was finally tried in Kosovo in 2007, it proved remarkably successful there 
as well. Evidence from both case studies thus clearly indicates that capacity-building for 
electoral management benefits markedly from daily interaction between local and 
international actors. Even taking into account the event-driven short-termism inherent in all 
international election support, co-location remains a valuable tool as it dovetails easily with 
the team-oriented working style typical in this field. Yet it needs to be emphasized once 
again how important personalities are in this context. The decision to co-locate (or not co-
locate) was in both UNMIK and UNMIL taken by senior mission staff. Successful 
cooperation also calls for qualified international personnel with an acute sensitivity for 
intercultural problems and a deep understanding of local ownership issues and the 
instruments for mentoring, advising and the actual transfer of responsibilities. 
                                                                              
223  CEEOM Preliminary Statement, November 18, 2007, available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/events/ 
2007_kosovo/prelim_statement_en.asp> (last visited April 9, 2010). 
224  Due to the expected pay-cut of such a move and the known lack of capacities at the CECS. 
225  Electoral Division, Final Report on the 2005 Elections, p. 62. 
44 
 
5.  Conclusions and Findings 
 
The research confirmed that there are essentially three unanswered questions underlying 
the relationship between peacebuilding and local ownership: First, it is unclear what local 
ownership actually means; second, there is a lack of guidance concerning whom to select 
as local partners; and third, how and by whom should success in peacebuilding be 
measured best?226  
The answers to these questions depend on the underlying objectives of international 
peacebuilding programs. Local ownership might generally be easier to achieve if 
international activity applies a communitarian approach that aims to restore a given status 
quo rather than if the intervention engages in social engineering driven by a liberal peace 
agenda. It might be argued that the more the international post-conflict assistance seeks 
change in local attitudes and beliefs, the more difficult it is to ensure local ownership. 
Whether a communitarian or a cosmopolitan lens is used to guide an international 
intervention also has significant influence on the selection of local partners. In how far does 
the international community cooperate closely with agents of change or compromise for 
the sake of peace with existing power holders (who might be reluctant to change)? Is it the 
state and its institutions that matter as partners in international peacebuilding or should 
international actors also engage with civil society and the general public?  
 
Concept and Definition 
The lack of clarity concerning the definition of local ownership made it difficult to 
operationalize the concept for the research questions. Many interview partners had 
difficulties in understanding the term “local ownership” mistaking it, for example, for 
property ownership. As a consequence, many conclusions on the understanding of and 
approaches to local ownership had to be drawn indirectly, for instance by enquiring how 
patterns of interaction between local and international stakeholders worked in practice.  
Mirroring the academic discourse, most interview partners commented on local ownership 
as both a process and an outcome. It was stated that genuine local ownership exists when 
local actors design, manage and implement institutions or projects themselves. However, 
international interview partners in Kosovo in particular argued that local ownership would 
also be implemented through a buy-in of local partners into internationally designed and 
supervised programs. Interviewees identified or described three basic means to achieve 
local ownership in newly created institutions: Besides a gradual handover of planning, 
management, and oversight competencies to local actors, local participation in relevant 
decision-making processes and various forms of capacity-building were seen to be the 
main means to effect a local appropriation of international programs and ideas. 
 
Perspectives Matter 
As regards the selection of local partners, the research demonstrates that the United 
Nations applied a state-centric approach to its rule of law-related activities and in the field 
of electoral assistance. In particular, UNMIL’s approach to justice reform in Liberia shows 
that traditional and/or informal actors are mostly left outside the peace operation’s purview. 
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This finding does not come as a great surprise for a member state organization such as 
the United Nations which sees the state and its institutions as the entry point into the host 
country’s society.  
Whether this approach achieved or fostered local ownership in newly created institutions or 
systems depends to a large extent on the perspective of the viewer. For example, it may 
be argued that the Liberian judiciary is locally owned by state actors, but not by the rural 
population which lacks access and often prefers traditional dispute settlement. It may also 
be maintained that Kosovo’s judiciary is appreciated as “theirs” by the Kosovo Albanians, 
whereas Kosovo Serbs reject it.  
Moreover, findings on local ownership also look different depending on the level of 
analysis. UNMIK governance and lawmaking is an interesting case in point. By granting 
Kosovars more and more participatory rights and responsibilities, UNMIK could state that it 
generally fostered local ownership with the establishment of the JIAS and even more so 
with the PISG. However, in the justice sector these developments were paralleled by 
tightened international control leading to a de facto withdrawal of participatory rights in the 
administration of justice and justice-related lawmaking. Yet as the judicial appointment 
process by UNMIK shows, there might still be much local ownership in the implementation 
of relevant programs or projects even if international actors heavily dominate the general 
sector policy. A similar example in this context is the OSCE election policy in Kosovo. 
While the organization determined electoral policies for the 2007 elections in a heavy-
handed manner at the central level (despite its “Kosovarization” rhetoric), the cooperation 
between international and local stakeholders continued to work very well on the municipal 
level leading the OSCE to early transfer many responsibilities to Kosovar election staff. 
 
Differences between Executive and Non-Executive Missions 
The approaches undertaken to promote local ownership significantly differed in the 
executive mission UNMIK and the non-executive mission UNMIL. Endowed with full 
governance powers and without recognized Kosovar partner institutions at the outset, local 
ownership was generally more problematic in Kosovo than it was the case with UNMIL in 
Liberia where a national government bore primary responsibility for public policy. While 
UNMIK needed to find the right balance of international intervention and achieving local 
acceptance of newly created institutions, UNMIL’s main role was to provide rule of law and 
electoral assistance in support of Liberian policies. Emphasizing Liberian ownership, 
UNMIL refrained from putting undue pressure on the Liberian government, for example by 
withholding development funds when certain reform objectives were delayed or not 
implemented at all. As a result of its executive mandate, UNMIK was generally more 
preoccupied with regulation and institution-building requiring strategies for a buy-in of local 
stakeholders by means of local participation in corresponding decision-making processes. 
In contrast thereto, UNMIL’s main focus lay on technical advice and on capacity-building 
for existing local structures.  
The research confirmed that the relationship between international and local counterparts 
is in many ways asymmetric. As was shown with respect to UNMIK, there is a tendency in 
executive missions that international actors dominate the setting and push programs 
through that they deem to be necessary for the implementation of the mandate. In non-
executive missions like UNMIL, local power structures and knowledge generally play a 
much more important role. If local actors cannot easily be forced to adopt or to implement 
certain policies, there is more room for their priorities and pace. As the Liberian case 
demonstrates, this might also lead to a certain degree of reform inertia or to the use of co-
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located international staff members for work assignments or purposes that contravene 
international mission policy.  
Some surprising findings concerning local ownership could be made in both missions. 
While some interviewees in Kosovo argued that the notion of local ownership could not be 
reconciled with an executive mandate, the statements of many local stakeholders indicated 
that certain UNMIK key projects in the justice sector do indeed enjoy significant support of 
relevant Kosovar circles. Focusing on the local judiciary as such, on the new Kosovo 
Judicial Council and Ministry of Justice as well as on the new criminal and criminal 
procedure legislation, there are some indications that UNMIK was able to create (at least 
some degree of) local ownership in relevant new institutions and systems despite its 
executive powers. Of course, the caveat must be made in this context that it is always 
extremely difficult to arrive at sound conclusions regarding the acceptance by local 
stakeholders or even the general public. Moreover, the research design did not envisage a 
representative survey of relevant local opinions, but relied on anecdotal evidence in 
particular with regard to the views and attitudes of local counterparts. 
The research revealed a somewhat inverted situation with respect to the non-executive 
mission UNMIL. Although the responsible Liberian government strongly insisted on 
national sovereignty and might thus be presumed to be the local owner in justice- and 
elections-related policy, doubts arise as to how far this ownership is not just of formal 
nature. Various interviewees stated that much of the substantive preparatory work for 
relevant policy- and decision-making was undertaken by UNMIL or other international staff 
who remain in the back nevertheless. Moreover, the argument can be made that real 
Liberian ownership would have required much more international intervention to ensure 
that the majority of the population living in rural areas actually has access to (and therefore 
appreciation of) the justice system and other state institutions legitimized by international 
assistance. 
 
Different Working Styles in Rule of Law and Elections Sectors 
Major differences in the approaches to local ownership also existed with respect to the 
sectors researched: electoral administration and the rule of law. While the former is often 
referred to as an event-driven business that operates with clear and short-term objectives, 
the latter is a core governance issue and requires long-term commitment. It may be argued 
that the nature of the electoral work is generally more technical and “hands-on” than 
justice-reform activity or related capacity-building. Therefore, it seems that the cooperation 
between local and international election officers was easier than for example between local 
and international legal experts and judges. In many cases, members of the latter 
professional group are used to do solitary and reflective work making it more difficult for 
them to “co-govern” or to cooperate within a mixed team than is the case with team-
oriented “practitioners.” This finding is confirmed by the fact that the cooperation between 
international and Kosovar judges seemed to be more problematic than the cooperation 
between their more team-oriented prosecutor colleagues.  
 
Leadership and Personalities Matter 
How the cooperation between international and local counterparts works in practice 
depends to a large degree on the mission leadership. For example, decisions by the senior 
management have a great influence on how the mission mandate is interpreted. Whether 
the leadership applies a heavy-handed approach or walks softly in crucial political 
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situations has a significant impact on local ownership. In most cases, it is the mission 
leadership that determines when and under which conditions international responsibilities 
are transferred to local actors. It also depends on the foresight and persistence of the 
senior managers to implement relevant transfer strategies. Many interviewees observed 
that local ownership-related policies are often based on ad hoc decisions rather than on 
long-term planning. Moreover, local ownership might remain rhetoric because international 
actors are unwilling to allow their local counterparts to make their own mistakes. 
Furthermore, a transfer of responsibilities from international into local hands might be 
delayed because international staff members are afraid of losing their jobs.  
Adequate social competence and cultural awareness of international actors are decisive 
for a fruitful work relationship between local and international partners and hence the 
creation of local ownership. This applies to each working level of a peace operation. In 
many cases the leadership style of the senior management toward local counterparts is 
reproduced in the interactions between international and local actors on the lower levels. 
The research revealed that changes in the mission leadership that entailed substantial 
alterations of local ownership-related attitudes and policies had a significant effect on the 
field level. However, it was also observed that misconduct or failures on the lower levels 
compromise the reputation of a peace operation as such and might thus seriously impact 
the willingness of local actors to cooperate with the international presence.  
 
Best Practices to Foster International-Local Cooperation 
International actors mostly lack sufficient knowledge of local structures and traditions. 
Local actors often lack adequate technical knowledge and professional skills. It can be 
maintained that successful peacebuilding is best achieved when both international and 
domestic resources are mobilized and complement each other to reach a common goal for 
example in building up new public institutions or systems. In the words of Donais, such 
cooperation requires “an ongoing conversation across the international-local cultural 
divide” that is to achieve “a basic consensus on the shape of the peace to be built.”227 The 
research showed that there are no blueprints on how to bring about this conversation. 
However, there are a couple of best practices that a mission should explore to improve the 
international-local interface and interaction.  
This includes in principle the early and continuous involvement of local stakeholders in 
relevant decision-making processes, in particular in the case of an executive mission. 
Sound local participation can only function if adequate language support is provided 
throughout the process. Moreover, local participation is only meaningful if international 
actors respect local thinking and take local proposals seriously. A serious participation 
process will most likely involve different timelines and decision-making procedures than 
originally envisaged and therefore calls for much flexibility on behalf of all actors involved. 
Co-location schemes have the great potential of bringing local and international actors 
closely together and helping them to learn from each other. Particularly in the area of 
electoral support, the research results have proven the clear benefits of co-location. 
However, it also carries the risk that international-local cooperation worsens, especially 
when international staff does not possess sufficient soft skills. Interview partners indicated 
that co-location programs are likely to fail if the disparities between international and local 
partners are too high, for example if co-located international staff arrive with big cars and 
receive well-equipped office spaces whereas their local counterparts struggle with 
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everyday living conditions. Nevertheless, since 2011 the UN is making co-location a 
prerequisite for its missions: “International personnel should be physically co-located within 
national institutions, as long as their safety and security can be ensured. This principle 
should be adopted by all international actors in conflict-affected States. For the United 
Nations, exceptions to this policy should have to be justified.”228 
A mission should certainly consider increasing local capacity-building by means of 
mentoring, advising, and on-the-job learning. However, it is not easy to make the work 
relationship between local actors and international mentors and advisors fruitful. 
Internationals must be very careful not to appear to be patronizing or babysitting their local 
counterparts who will possess important knowledge and resources required for a 
sustainable intervention.  
The research also showed that the increased engagement of and cooperation with 
younger local staff members can be a beneficial undertaking. This group might be less 
involved in the conflict history and more willing to accept international ideas and working 
styles than their older colleagues. Yet youth can also be extremist and adopt retrograde 
attitudes. And even if young and able local counterparts are available to promote new 
thinking and management strategies, international actors must be aware that the 
involvement of the young might come at the cost of the older generation of local 
professionals. Such policy might unduly disrupt local traditions and seniority and therefore 
hamper the creation of local ownership in general.  
Similarly the involvement of the diaspora or of regional expertise offers many chances to 
bridge the local-international divide. For example for UNMIL, it proved to be very useful to 
engage West African facilitators to break up a Liberian reform deadlock. Western 
facilitators would most likely not have been accepted so well, partly because of their 
colonialist past. Another example is the active cooperation with qualified legal experts (and 
translators) from Slovenia or Albania in the drafting of the new criminal and criminal 
procedure legislation in Kosovo. This approach ensured regional compatibility and 
contributed to the acceptance of the new legal systems by the Kosovar legal community 
and other relevant circles. However, local stakeholders might also resent the input of 
experts of the diaspora or of neighboring countries. Moreover, such experts might not be 
neutral actors, but be strongly affiliated with the conflict history and promote one-sided 
governance strategies or reform policies. 
At least in the short run, the use of NPOs is an important tool to bring qualified local 
knowledge into international program planning and implementation. However, the OSCE’s 
Kosovarization policy of the electoral administration demonstrates that a heavy reliance on 
NPOs tends to create an alternative structure that stands in some rivalry to the local 
administration. International organizations are likely to attract the best-qualified local 
professionals because they pay much higher salaries than local authorities. This situation 
might weaken local authorities and also raises the question of sustainability in employment 
and capacity-building. In particular in post-conflict societies with much brain drain 
international actors should consider employing qualified local professionals as NPOs, but 
allow them to accept assignments for local administrations or universities in addition to 
their service to the peace operation.  
Training is not just a major tool to improve technical knowledge and skills, but should also 
foster social competence and cultural awareness. Both local and international stakeholders 
need these qualities in post-conflict peace operations. This means that successful 
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peacebuilding requires that local as well as international actors should receive training for 
hard and soft skills they are missing. When it comes to training for local professionals to 
learn about newly established institutions and systems, qualified local trainers will be the 
best persons to transmit the knowledge to the trainees in most cases. However, the UNMIL 
case study has shown that local stakeholders such as lawyers might prefer that 
international colleagues provide training because they are regarded to be more competent 
than their local colleagues. In terms of methodology, it appears that practical and 
interactive training is in general more fruitful than abstract and theoretical classroom 
teaching. Moreover, a combined approach to legislative drafting and training is helpful as 
the legislative process concerning a new Law on Courts in Kosovo demonstrates.  
 
Expectation Management: Change or Stability? 
Success is difficult to measure in international peacebuilding. Yet it is safe to say that 
many post-conflict scenarios exist where international assistance seems to produce only 
unsatisfactory results. To some extent this is due to an unrealistic or undefined definition of 
the objectives of a given international engagement. Is a peace operation set up to promote 
change in the sense of implementing a liberal peace agenda, or is it driven by a desire to 
stabilize a post-conflict society, if necessary with the support of local power structures that 
violate or compromise international standards and principles? The required length and 
duration of an international engagement in a post-conflict scenario depend to a large 
extent on the approach taken.  
What is certainly needed to improve the situation is a better and more realistic expectation 
management of what a peace operation is able to achieve. This relates both to the target 
societies as well as to the donor nations. Too often post-conflict populations attach high 
hopes to the international engagement at the outset of a peace operation, but become very 
frustrated once they realize that their deplorable living conditions will not change quickly. It 
goes without saying that new institutions and systems established by or with the support of 
the international community are not likely to become locally owned if they fail to deliver the 
promised results on the ground.  
But also donor governments must better relay the aims and costs of international 
peacebuilding to their electorates. Irrespective of whether a peace operation engages in 
social engineering or simply in ad hoc crisis management, successful international 
assistance requires sustainable and long-term efforts. To arrive there, Western politicians 
and taxpayers must better understand that managing failed states belongs to the genuine 
governance tasks of the international community (and not just the broken state authorities) 
and that a sound and successful engagement will possibly involve substantial international 
involvement on a long-term basis. Abolishing or integrating harmful or disruptive social 
structures or even changing a post-conflict society’s traditions and beliefs is in most cases 
a task that will take generations to be completed.  
It seems clear that if the international community wants real change in a post-conflict 
society, it must invest in it and also alter its own approaches to post-conflict assistance and 
governance. To mitigate the dilemmas relating to the intrusiveness of and dependency on 
the international intervention, international actors should sooner rather than later grant 
substantial ownership to local key actors in the planning and implementation of 
peacebuilding projects and programs. Such policy would require local actors to define their 
priorities and would make them responsible for their implementation. It would involve a 
learning-by-doing approach that allows local actors to make their own mistakes and to 
make progress at their own pace.  
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If substantial ownership is not an option in certain phases of a peace process, international 
actors should at least spend considerable energy and resources on achieving a buy-in of 
local stakeholders in newly established institutions or systems. This would include a better 
“conversation” between international and local actors building upon the best practices 
outlined above. As an exception and based on prudent reflection, international actors 
should also consider making their support conditional on the implementation of certain 
reform activities by local actors.  
It has often been pointed out (and is re-emphasized in this report) that meaningful 
international assistance must be flexible in approach, efficient in delivery, and sustainable 
in support.229 Besides a better expectation management of its constituencies, the 
peacebuilding community should introduce longer budget cycles than presently used. It 
should also consider simplifying its procurement and deployment procedures and make 
them more flexible to suit the local context better. Moreover, international organizations 
and donor nations should rethink their coordination mechanisms to ensure that 
international assistance is delivered in a sound and fruitful manner. 
 
Final Remarks 
This research indicates that international interventions can work if they are well-designed 
and implemented in a sustainable manner. It also reveals that international interventions 
can be locally owned, even if they are introduced via international actors. This happens 
when international actors win the hearts and minds of the relevant local stakeholders or 
population, possibly without or against the will of the local government. International 
interventions can also be locally owned if they alter local (legal) traditions, i.e. when they 
are introduced with sufficient local participation and the consent of local key actors.  
Meaningful international assistance is context-sensitive, takes time, and requires 
substantial financial commitments. Quick fixes do not exist even if donor countries use a 
different rhetoric. International peacebuilding will only bear positive results if international 
actors match their interventions with a willingness to invest in change. It may be argued 
that the harsher the change desired, the more resources and time need to be invested. 
The smaller the investment, the more a peace operation will have to cooperate with local 
actors who violate international norms and standards. Initiating changes without sufficient 
backup and persistence might severely compromise international values and credibility. 
One open question is whether entering a post-conflict context half-heartedly causes more 
harm for the local context than does local “self-regulation” without any international 
involvement.  
                                                                              
229  For an overview of the supply-side problems in international assistance see L. Nathan, “The Challenge of Local 
Ownership in SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice,” in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. T. Donais, 
DCAF Yearbook 6, 2008, p. 20.  
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6.  Transfer of Findings and Future Research 
 
The project presented major findings of the project at two validation expert roundtables in 
Berlin and New York in June 2009. A combination of practitioners and academics were 
present at both events. Further presentations at national and international conferences are 
already planned as well as a briefing for German parliamentarians and ministerial staff. For 
that activity ZIF is putting together a briefing note on local ownership. Further publications 
in academic journals are also envisaged. 
In addition, the findings of the project were incorporated in ZIF’s “Core Course Peace 
Operations” which takes place twice every year. The project’s insights have already been 
used for ZIF’s new joint training course with the German police and the German armed 
forces on “Mentoring and Advising in the Field” in 2010 and 2011. Additional research is 
envisaged on EULEX Kosovo’s “Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising” scheme in 2011 and 
2012. 
Moreover, the center was able to acquire funding from the German Foreign Office for a 
follow-up project on rule of law. With the Rule of Law training program, ZIF provides 
induction training in close cooperation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) for the responsible UN Judicial Affairs Officer as well as for a limited 
number of “rule of law resource persons” from developing countries. 
Other issues to follow up on are co-location and the use of NPO schemes in various peace 
operations. Not only during the interviews in the field, but also when presenting the results 
to UN staff in New York, these issues have raised a lot of interest. There has thus far been 
a lack of knowledge on already implemented co-location schemes in peace operations. A 
closer look into the pros and cons of this measure could provide practical benefits for 
international missions. The same holds true for the employment and training of NPOs 
within the structures of an international peace operation. Whether or not this contributes to 
ownership and better national capacities or actually increases the problem of “brain drain”, 
i.e. young national experts leaving the country for better jobs, needs to be analyzed in 
more detail. 
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ABA  American Bar Association 
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CEEOM Council of Europe Election Observation Mission 
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CECS Central Election Commission Secretariat 
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CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
DED Department of Election Development 
DEO Department of Election Operations 
DPA Department of Political Affairs 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DSF German Foundation for Peace Research 
EAD Electoral Assistance Division 
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EMB Electoral Management Body 
ESO Electoral Support Officer 
ED Electoral Division (UNMIL) 
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ED Electoral Division (OSCE) 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IFES International Foundation for Elections Systems 
JIAS Joint Interim Administrative Structure 
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre 
KSPO Kosovo Special Prosecutors Office 
MEC Municipal Election Commission 
MEO Municipal Elections Officer 
NCSC National Center for State Courts 
NEC National Elections Commission 
NPO National Professional Officer 
NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia 
PAE Pan American Engineers Inc.  
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
STO Short-Term Observer 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNV United Nations Volunteer 
ZIF Center for International Peace Operations 
 
 
Topical Areas for the Questionnaire 
? Interviewee’s Function 
? Definition and Concept LO 
? Mission Mandate and LO (strategic level) 
? Knowledge and Training and LO 
? Project Management and LO (operational) 
? Types of interaction (general) 
? Types of interaction (local view) 
? Types of interaction (international view) 
? Dealing with existing structures 
? Handover/exit 
? Earlier experience/comparison 
54 
 
References 
 
Amnesty International. Kosovo (Serbia): The Challenge to Fix a Failed UN Justice Mission. 
AI Report. January 29, 2008. 
Blume, T. “Implementing the Rule of Law in Integrated Missions: Security and Justice in 
the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).” Journal of Security Sector Management 6 
(2008) 3: pp. 1-18. 
Bull, C. No Entry without Strategy: Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional 
Administration. Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press, 2008. 
Bush, K. “Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Developmental Agenda for 
Peacebuilding.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies (Special Issue, 1996): 
pp. 75-92. 
Carlowitz, L. von. “UNMIK Lawmaking between Effective Peace Support and Internal Self-
Determination.” Archiv des Völkerrechts 41 (2003) 3: pp. 336-393. 
Carlowitz, L. von. “Migranten als Garanten. Über die Schwierigkeiten beim 
Rechtsstaatsexport in Nachkriegsgesellschaften.” HSFK Standpunkte 6 (2004). 
Carlowitz, L. von. “Local Ownership and the Rule of Law in Liberia.” Law in Africa 11 
(2008) 1: pp.71-81  
Carvalho, B. de, and N. Schia. Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia. 
Foreign and Domestic Inside Out? Oslo: NUPI, 2011. 
Chesterman, S. “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN State 
Building Operations.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1 (2007) 1: pp. 3-26. 
Chesterman, S. You, the People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State-Building. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Chopra, J., and T. Hohe. “Participatory Intervention.” Global Governance 10 (2004) 3: pp. 
289-306. 
CEEOM. Preliminary Statement (November 18, 2007). 
Donais, T. “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding Processes.” Peace & Change 34 (2009) 1: pp. 3-26. 
Donais, T., ed. Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. DCAF Yearbook 6, Geneva: 
2008. 
Duettmann, M., Elections in Post-Conflict Countries. KAIPTC/ZIF Report, 2009. 
Ellis, A. et al. “Effective Electoral Assistance. Moving from Event-based Support to Process 
Support.” Stockholm: IDEA Publications, 2006. 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding - 
National Report from Germany. 2003.  
Golub, S. “Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative.” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Papers, Rule of Law Series 
No. 41. October 2003. 
Hansen, A. “Local Ownership in Peace Operations.” In Local Ownership and Security 
Sector Reform. Edited by T. Donais. DCAF Yearbook 6, 2008, pp. 39-58. 
55 
 
Hansen, A., and S. Wiharta. The Transition to a Just Order after Conflict. Policy Report, 
draft 2006. 
Hansen, A. et al. “The Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership after 
Conflict. A Practitioners’ Guide.” FBA Handbook Series. 2007. 
Hansen, W. et al. “Ansätze, Erfahrungen und Erfolgsbedingungen.” In Local Ownership in 
Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States. ZIF research proposal. 2005. 
Hartmann, M. E. International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post-
Conflict Peacekeeping. USIP Special Report 112. October 2003. 
Hurwitz, A. “Civil War and Rule of Law: Toward Security, Development, and Human 
Rights.” In Civil War and the Rule of Law. Security, Development, Human Rights . 
Edited by A. Hurwitz. London: Boulder, 2008, pp. 1-20. 
King, I., and  W. Mason. Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006. 
Malan, M. Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings. 
Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008. 
Marschall, D., and S. Inglis. “The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): pp. 
95-146. 
Narten, J. “Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: A Case Study on External-
local Dynamics in Kosovo under UN Interim Administration.” Paper presented at the 
International Studies Association Conference in Chicago. March 3, 2007. 
Narten, J. “Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: the Case of Postwar Kosovo.” In The 
Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations. Edited by R. Paris and T. Sisk. London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 252-284. 
Nathan, L. “Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors.” Geneva: 
DCAF 2006. 
Nathan, L. “The Challenge of Local Ownership in SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice,” 
in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. T. Donais, DCAF Yearbook 6, 
2008, pp.19-38. 
Newman, E., and O. Richmond. “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and 
Peacebuilding.” UNU Policy Brief No. 2. 2006. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “Shaping the 21st 
Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation.” OECD Development 
Assistance Committee. 1996. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “Strategic Plan: 2001-
2005.” OSCE Department of Election Operations. June 2001. 
Panarelli, Cf. L. Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform. Washington, DC: USIP, 2010. 
Palmer, S. L. et al. Report of an Electoral Assessment and Planning Mission to Liberia: 
April 4-25, 2004. IFES Report. 2004. 
Pastor, A. R. “The Role of Electoral Administrations in Democratic Transitions: Implications 
for Policy and Research.” Democratization 6 (1999) 4: pp. 1-27. 
56 
 
Pietz, T., and L. von Carlowitz. Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed 
States. ZIF Report. 2007. 
Pouligny, B. “Supporting Local Ownership in Humanitarian Action.” GPPi Policy Paper No. 
4. Berlin: 2009. 
Rausch, C. “From Elation to Disappointment: Justice and Security Sector Reform in 
Kosovo.” In Constructing Justice and Security After War: Edited by C. T. Call. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007, pp. 271-311. 
Reich, H. “Local Ownership in Conflict Transformation Projects. Partnership, Participation 
or Patronage?” Berghof Occasional Paper Issue 27. Berlin: 2006. 
Reilly, B. “Post-Conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers.” International Peacekeeping 9 
(2002) 2: pp. 118-139. 
Reilly, B. “International Electoral Assistance. A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons 
Learned.” The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael.” 
Working Paper 17. June 2003, p. 18. 
Rossbacher, D. “Friedenssicherung – am Beispiel der Interimsverwaltung der Vereinten 
Nationen im Kosovo (UNMIK). Die Zivilverwaltung als neue Form der 
Friedenssicherung.” Münster: Univ. Diss., 2003. 
Scheye, E. “Unknotting Local Ownership Redux: Bringing Non-State/Local Justice 
Networks Back In.” In Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. Edited by T. 
Donais. Geneva: DCAF 2008, pp. 59-82. 
Scheye, E. “Transitions to Local Authority.” In Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in 
Peace Operations. Edited by R. Dwan. SIPRI Research Report No. 16. 2002. 
Scheye, E. “UNMIK and the Significance of Effective Programme Management: The Case 
of Kosovo.” In Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experiences 
from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo. Edited by H. 
Hänggi and V. Scherrer. Geneva: DCAF 2008, pp. 169-228. 
Scheye, E., and G. Peake. “Unknotting Local Ownership.” In After Intervention: Public 
Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable 
Local Ownership. Edited by A. H. Ebnöther and P. H. Fluri. Vienna and Geneva: 
2005, pp. 235-260. 
Schröder, A. Der Beitrag internationaler Richter und Staatsanwälte zur Entwicklung der 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit im Kosovo. ZIF Report. August 2004. 
Sending, O. J. “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context.” 
NUPI Working Paper 755. 2009. 
Stahn, C. “Constitution without a State? Kosovo under the United Nations Constitutional 
Framework for Self-Government.” In Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001) 
3: pp. 531-561. 
Strohmeyer, H. “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor.” American Journal of International Law 95 
(2001) 1: pp. 46-63. 
Stromseth, J., D. Wippman, and R. Brooks. Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of 
Law After Military Interventions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
57 
 
United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/1999/779. July 12, 1999. 
United Nations. Report on the Panel on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
(“Brahimi Report”). UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809. August 21, 2000. 
United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General, No Exit without Strategy: Security 
Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. UN Doc. S/2001/394. April 20, 2001. 
United Nations. UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9 on a Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. May 15, 2001. 
United Nations. UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/19 on the Executive Branch of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo. September 13, 2001. Annex IX. 
United Nations. Security Council S/Res. 1509. September 19, 2003. 
United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. UN Doc. S/2004/616. August 23, 2004. 
United Nations. Final Report on the 2005 Elections. UNMIL Electoral Division. 
United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. Strengthening the Role of the United 
Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine 
Elections and the Promotion of Democratization. UN Doc. A/60/431. October 14, 
2005. 
United Nations. UN Doc. A/60/431. October 14, 2005. 
United Nations. Administrative Direction No. 2006/15 Implementing UNMIK Regulation No. 
2000/15 on the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Justice. 
September 30, 2006. 
United Nations. “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to Rule of Law 
Assistance.” 2008. 
United Nations. Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the 
Senior Advisory Group, February 22, 2011. 
Vig, S. “The Conflictual Promises of United Nations’ Rule of Law Assistance: Challenges 
for Post-Conflict Societies.” Journal of International Peacekeeping 13 (2009) 1-2: 
pp. 131-158. 
Wilde, R. “The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When International Organizations 
Administer Territory.” American Society of International Law Proceedings 95 (2001): 
pp. 251-258. 
Zaum, D. The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF). “Ansätze, Erfahrungen und 
Erfolgsbedingungen.” In Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed 
States. ZIF research proposal. Berlin: 2005. 
 
 
 
58 
 
List of Interviewed Persons  
 
Addy, David Nii, Technical Advisor, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Center (KAIPTC) and GTZ, Ghana, November 2, 2007 
Agimi, Ilire, Researcher, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development 
(KIPRED), Kosovo, September 28, 2007 
Ali, Helen, Judicial Affairs Officer, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 6, 2007 
Andrews, Jonathan, Special Assistant to the Deputy SRSG for Recovery and Governance, 
UNMIL, Liberia, November 5, 2007 
Appenzeller, Stephanie, Office for Internal Investigations, UNMIL, November 6, 2007 
Arraiza, Jose Maria, Senior Human Rights Advisor, Human Rights and Rule of Law, 
OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, March 10, 2008 
Autheman, Violaine, Legal Consultant, National Center for State Courts (NCSC), Kosovo, 
March 14, 2008 
Ashford, Amanda, Senior Legal Advisor, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, October 3, 2007 and 
March 15 2008 
Azikiwe, Sandra, Civil Affairs Expert, UNMIL, Liberia, November 7, 2007 
Bala, Zija, Executive Officer, Central Election Commission, Kosovo, March 14, 2008 
Balant, Timothy, International Judge, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 17, 2008 
Baraliu, Mazllum, Chief Executive Officer, Central Election Commission, Kosovo, March 
13, 2008 
Barclay, Corpu, Member, Committee on Election and Inauguration, Central Election 
Committee, March 12, 2008 
Barley, Catherine, Special Advisor to DSRSG, Rule of Law, UNMIL, Liberia, November 10 
and 11, 2008 
Basha, Bujar, Project Liaison Officer, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, September 28, 2007 and 
March 14 and 16, 2008 
Berisha, Isuf, Senior Researcher, Kosovar Institute for Journalism and Communication, 
Kosovo, March 7, 2008 
Blais, Xavier, Head of Pristina RO, Housing and Property Directorate, UNMIK, Kosovo, 
March 11, 2008 
Bloch, Alain, International Judge, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 14, 2008 
Boolell, Vinod, International Judge, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 18, 2008 
Booth, Nick, Special Assistant to PDSRSG, UNMIK, Kosovo, October 1, 2007 
Borg-Olivier, Alexander, Director, Office of the Legal Advisor, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 18, 
2008 
Brandt, Annette, Human Dimension Officer, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, September 29, 2007 
Buse, Martin, Attorney, Trainer, Kosovo Institute for Public Administration (KIPA), Kosovo, 
October 3, 2007 
59 
 
Buway, Dada, Senior Magistrate, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 17, 2008 
Callaghan, Marjo, Head, Corrections Advisory Unit, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 5, 
2008 
Cassandra, Adriano, Civil Affairs Officer, UNMIL, Liberia, November 5, 2008 
Clarke, Moses G., Program Associate, IFES-Liberia, Liberia, November 7, 2007, and April 
15, 2008 
Clausing, Silke, Legal Analyst, Legal System Monitoring Section, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, 
October 3, 2007  
Coleman, Felicia, former Supreme Court Judge, Counselor at Law, Dunbar & Dunbar, 
Liberia, November 2, 2007 and November 10, 2008 
Cyllah, Almami I., Country Director IFES-Liberia, Liberia, November 7, 2007, and April 23 
and 25, 2008 
Cubbon, John, former Judicial Affairs Officer, UNMIK, September 29, 2008, telephone 
interview 
Dalton, Nathan, Legal Officer, Department of Justice, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 13, 2008 
Dampier, Harold, International Advisor, Kosovo Judicial Institute, OSCE, Kosovo, March 
14. 2008 
Dean, Robert L., Acting Director, International Prosecutor, Department of Justice, UNMIK, 
Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Dedeurwaerdere, Thomas, Project Manager, Capacity Building for European Integration, 
UNDP, Kosovo, October 1, 2007 
Demolli, Haki, Director, Kosovo Law Center (KLC), Kosovo, March 19, 2008 
Di Donatantonio, Roberto, Justice Expert, EUPT, Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Doss, Alan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNMIL, Liberia, November 
7, 2007 
Duettmann, Martina, Democratization Officer, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, September 28, 2007 
Dugolli, Ilir, Head of Special Research Projects, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and 
Development (KIPRED), Kosovo, September 28, 2007 
Dumnica, Virgjina, National Program Analyst, UNDP, Kosovo, October 3, 2007 
Dushi, Florian, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Justice, Kosovo, March 18, 2008 
Ebba-Davidson, Jeanette A., Commissioner, National Elections Commission, Liberia, 
November 9, 2007 
Enwall, Mike, Country Representative, International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), 
Liberia, November 12, 2008 
Fabiansson, Catharina, Montserrado County Coordinator, Civil Affairs, UNMIL, Liberia, 
November 9, 2007 
Ferry, John, Consultant, National Center for State Courts (NCSC), Kosovo, March 19, 
2008 
Fields, John N., International Judge, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 7, 2008 
60 
 
Fofie, Alfred, Director, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 5 and 6, 2007 
Frahm, Michael, Senior Legal Officer, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, October 2, 2007 
Freeman, Senesee G., Senior Program Officer, IFES-Liberia, Liberia, April 24, 2008 
Fromayan, James M., Chairman of the National Elections Commission, Liberia, November 
7, 2007 
Fulton, Hugh, Elections Technical Advisor, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, October 2, 2007 
Garbie, Nathan P., Deputy Executive Director for External Relations, National Election 
Commission, Liberia, April 22, 2008 
Garsuah, Ansumana, Speaker, Traditional Council of Chiefs, Liberia, November 11, 2008 
Gashi, Rame, Chairman, Chamber of Advocates of Kosovo, Kosovo, March 14, 2008 
Geekie, Russell, Public Information Officer, UNMIK, Kosovo, October 3, 2007 
Gibson, Charles, National Legal Advisor, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 7 and 12, 
2008 
Gillespie, Joseph K., Head, Human Rights and Protection Section, UNMIL, Liberia, 
November 3, 2008 
Gogoll, Yvonne, Associate Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Advisor, UNMIK, Kosovo, 
March 12, 2008 
Golegio, George, Chief Chairman of Traditional Council of Chiefs, Liberia, November 11 
and 13, 2008 
Gongloe, S. Vopea, Senior Magistrate, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 22, 
2008 
Gongloe, Tiawan, Solicitor General, Liberia, November 2, 2007 
Goyani, Yasmin, National Legal Officer, Monitoring Department, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, 
March 11, 2008 
Grey, Dewey, President Association of Female Lawyers, Liberia, November 7 and 13, 
2008 
Guldimann, Tim, Head of Mission, OSCE, Kosovo, March 13, 2008 
Gutman, Alan, Legal Officer, Office of the Senior Legal Advisor to the SRSG, UNMIL, 
Liberia, November 5, 2007, and April 25, 2008 
Hajdari-Peci, Drita, Senior Legal Advisor, National Center for State Courts (NCSC), 
Kosovo, March 17, 2008 
Haziri, Sokol, Director, Legal Aid Commission, Kosovo, March 13, 2008 
Hirst, Frazer, former Judicial Affairs Officer, UNMIL, December 2, 2008, telephone 
interview 
Hoefer-Wissing, Neithart, Political Advisor, International Civilian Office/EUPT, Kosovo, 
September 29, 2007, and March 17, 2008 
Hoffmann, Werner, LtC, Defense Attaché of the German Federal Republic, Liberia, 
November 4, 2007 
Holt, Benedict, Judge, Circuit Coutrt Grand Bassa County, Liberia, November 15, 2008 
61 
 
Howard-Taylor, Jewel, Senior Senator, Bong County, Liberia, November 2, 2007, and April 
29, 2008 
Hoxha, Brikena, former Legal Officer, Kosovo Office ABA, October 7, 2008, telephone 
interview 
Hummel, John, Director, The Carter Center, Liberia, November 7 and 14, 2008 
Huruglica, Ymer, Judge, Gnijan District Court, President of the Association of Judges, 
Kosovo, March 15, 2008 
Hyseni, Hydajet, Member of Kosovo Assembly, former Member of Kosovo Judicial Council, 
Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Jack, Boma, Head, Legal Education and Training Unit, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 
4, 2008 
Jacobs, Theo, Justice Expert, EUPT, Kosovo, March 7, 2008 
Jallah, David, Dean, Louis A. Grimes School of Law, Liberia, November 10, 2008 
Janova, Arsim, Deputy Minister of Justice, Ministry of Justice, Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Jarvon, Paul Philipp, Buchanan Defence Council, Liberia, November 15, 2008 
Johnson, Ambullai, Minister of Internal Affairs, Liberia, November 14, 2008 
Johnson, Miatta, Assistant Magistrate, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 23, 
2008 
Johnson-Morris, Frances, Minister of Commerce and Industry, former Head of the NEC, 
Liberia, November 6, 2007 
Johnston, Koboi, Former Minister of Justice, Liberia, November 6, 2007 
Johnston, Steven, Corrections Officer, CPAS, UNMIL, Liberia, November 7, 2007 
Joppe, Kirsten, Senior Human Rights/Legal Advisor, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, September 1, 
2007 
Juergens, Julia, Count and Results Centre International Shift Manager, Good Governance 
and Democratic Institutions, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, March 14, 2008 
Juszczak, Adam, Justice Expert, EUPT, Kosovo, March 17, 2008 
Kabashi, Ismet, Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor’s Office of Kosovo, Kosovo, March 17, 2008 
Kai-Kai, Francis, Chief of Civil Affairs Section, UNMIL, Liberia, April 22, 2008 
Kajtazi, Veton, former Judge, Legal Assistant, Civil Administration, UNMIK, Kosovo, 
September 28, 2007, and March 12, 2008 
Kakoma, Itonde, Project Manager, The Carter Center, Liberia, November 2, 2007, and 
November 2, 2008 
Kayway, Francis S., Member, Committee on Election and Inauguration, Central Election 
Committee, Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Kenkpen, Alice, Assistant Magistrate, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 23, 
2008 
Kennedy, Ray, former Head of UNMIL ED, Ghana, June 13, 2008, and USA, June 3, 2009 
62 
 
Kerveshi, Kujtim, Legal Consultant, former Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Kosovo, 
March 14, 2008 
Kleffner, Doris, Senior Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Officer, UNMIL, Liberia, 
April 25, 2008 
Kolgeci, Gezim, Deputy Director, Secretariat of Kosovo Judicial Council, Kosovo, March 
19, 2008 
Koster, Norbert, International Judge, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 10, 2008, and Berlin, June 
10, 2009, and April 22, 2010 
Krantz, Sheldon, Partner, DLA Piper, USA, April 24, 2009, telephone interview 
Krasniqi, Lavdim, Director, Kosovo Judicial Institute, Kosovo, March 14, 2008 
Kromah, Ansumana F., Commissioner, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 24, 
2008 
Lange, Andreas W., Human Resource Officer, Chief International Recruitment, UNMIL, 
Liberia, November 5, 2007, and April 23, 2008 
Lindemann-Macha, Ilse, Ambassador, German Embassy Monrovia, Liberia, November 5, 
2007, and April 17, 2008 
Lynch, Victoria A., Representative, Montserrado County, Chairman House Standing 
Committee on Public Works, Liberia, April 28, 2008 
Mafwenga, Alinikisa, Judicial Affairs Officer, UNMIL, Liberia, April 28, 2008 
Mbogori, Kagwiria, Human Rights Officer, UNMIL, Liberia, November 3, 2008 
McPhail, Stephanie, Head, Judiciary Advisory Unit, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 5, 
2007, and November 11 and 12, 2008 
Menthonnex, Pauline, Program Analyst, UNDP, Kosovo, September 28, 2007 
Mensa-Bonsu, Henrietta, DSRSG, Rule of Law, UNMIL, Liberia, November 4, 2008 
Mikullovci, Executive Officer, Central Election Commission, March 17, 2008 
Millaku, Reshat, Prosecutor, Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office, Kosovo, March 11, 2008 
Miller, Mary, Project Manager, The Carter Center, Liberia, November 7, 2007 
Monaghan, Thomas, former Director, Department of Justice, UNMIK, April 22, telephone 
interview 
Mors, Wolff-Michael, Legal Officer, Human Rights and Rule of Law, OSCE/UNMIK, 
Kosovo, October 2, 2007 
Mors-Jürgensen, Inger, Senior Reporting and Information Officer, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, 
October 3, 2007 
Morgan, Eva, Deputy Minister of Justice, Liberia, November 13, 2008 
Muharremi, Robert, Lecturer, American University Pristina, former Head of Policy and 
Legal Support Section, UNMIK, Kosovo, October 1, 2007, and March 10 and 13, 2008 
Neewoor, Rajiv, Program Manager, Kosovo Property Agency, Kosovo, March 18, 2008 
Neisse, Frank, Political/Security Advisor, EUPT, Kosovo, March 11, 2008 
Nelson, Elizabeth J., Co-Chairman, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 23, 2008 
63 
 
Newland, Daniel, Senior Magistrate, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 23, 
2008 
Nokaj, Anton, Judge and President of District Court Pristina, Chairperson of Kosovo 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, Kosovo, March 13, 2008 
Nwabydike, Ndubuisi, National Legal Advisor, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 10 2008 
Nyasulu, Kamudoni, Deputy Director, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 5, 2007, and 
November 3 and 12, 2008 
Osmani, Lirije, Attorney, Avokatura Osmani, Kosovo, March 17, 2008 
Pavlin, Peter, Legal Consultant, Kosovo, October 8, 2008, telephone interview 
Petilos, Erwin, Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office, UNMIK, Kosovo, October 1, 2007 
Pezi, Lulzim, Executive Director, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development 
(KIPRED), Kosovo, September 28, 2007 
Pinzaro, Fabio, Special Assistant to Chief International Prosecutor, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 
13, 2008 
Profos, Jolanda, Special Assistant/Coordination Officer, ODSRSG Recovery and 
Governance, UNMIL, Liberia, November 6, 2007 
Reeves, Della Irea King, Commissioner, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 23, 
2008 
Reeves, Lemuel, National Legal Advisor, LJSSD, UNMIL, Liberia, November 4, 2008 
Roccatello, Anna Myriam, Head of Legal Policy Division, Department of Justice, UNMIK, 
Kosovo, October 3, 2007, and March 15 and 18, 2008 
Rolando, Elizabeth, Head of Judicial Development Division, Department of Justice, 
UNMIK, Kosovo, September 30, 2007, and March 15 and 18, 2008 
Rosandhaug, Knut, Executive Director, Kosovo Property Agency, Kosovo,October 2, 2007 
Rueger, Christina, Legal Officer, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Salihaj, Jonuz, former Minister of Justice, General-Secretary of AAK, Kosovo, March 10, 
2008 
Shatri, Skender, Field Election Specialist, Department of Elections, OSCE/UNMIK, 
Kosovo, March 18, 2008 
Sirakov, Yordan, Judicial Administration Expert, EUPT, Kosovo, March 7, 2008 
Smith, Gabriel B., Representative, Grand Bassa County, Chairman of Election and 
Inauguration, Liberia, April 22, 2008 
Staletovic, Bogoljub, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Central Election Commission, 
Kosovo, March 18, 2008 
Starling, Kenneth, Partner, DLA Piper, USA, April 24, 2009, telephone interview 
Thomas, Alice, Special Advisor to Ombudsperson Institution (OIK)/Human Rights, 
OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, March 16, 2008 
Tooney, Mamma Zoe, Liberia, November 6 and 13, 2008 
64 
 
Tuah, Samuel G., Planning Officer, Traditional Council of Chiefs, Liberia, November 11, 
2008 
Tuhina, Aqif, Attorney, former Supreme Court Judge, Kosovo, March 12, 2008 
Ursino, Steven A., Country Director, UNDP Liberia, Ghana, November 1, 2007 
Valcke, Anthony, Director, American Bar Association, Africa Law Initiative, Liberia, 
November 7, 2007, and April 27 and November 11, 2008 
Vanhoutte, Peter, Senior Political Advisor, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, October 1, 2007 
Vela, Blerim, Program Officer, OSCE/UNMIK, Kosovo, October 2, 2007 
Verdier, Jerome, Chair, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Liberia, November 2, 2007 
Warttmann, Sofia, Associate RRR Officer, UNMIL, Liberia, November 7, 2007 
Weedor, Jonathan K., Commissioner, National Elections Commission, Liberia, April 22, 
2008 
Wiertz, Sheila, Consultant, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), Liberia, November 7, 
2008 
Wiggs, E. Drun-Willie, Deputy Chief Police, Grand Bassa County, Liberia, November 15, 
2008 
Williams, Elizabeth P., Representative, District Rivercess, Liberia, April 23, 2008 
Winterstein, Anna-Christina, Justice Expert, EUPT, Kosovo, September 28, 2007, and 
March 14, 2008 
Wittkowsky, Andreas, Deputy Head of UNMIK Pillar IV, UNMIK, Kosovo, March 7, 2008 
Xhemajli, Zait, Supreme Court Judge, Kosovo, March 10, 2008 
Zhitia Hilmi, Chief Prosecutor, Kosovo, March 10, 2008 
Zulu, Bokai S., Vice-Chairman of Traditional Council for Elders Affairs, Liberia, November 
11 and 13, 2008 
